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MAGGIE MCKINLEY

Petitioning and the Making of the Administrative
State
abstract. The administrative state is suffering from a crisis of legitimacy. Many have questioned the legality of the myriad commissions, boards, and agencies through which much of our
modern governance occurs. Scholars such as Jerry Mashaw, Theda Skocpol, and Michele Dauber,
among others, have provided compelling institutional histories, illustrating that administrative
lawmaking has roots in the early American republic. Others have attempted to assuage concerns
through interpretive theory, arguing that the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 implicitly
amended our Constitution. Solutions offered thus far, however, have yet to provide a deeper understanding of the meaning and function of the administrative state within our constitutional
framework. Nor have the lawmaking models of classic legal process theory, on which much of our
public law rests, captured the nuanced democratic function of these commissions, boards, and
agencies.
This Article takes a different tack. It begins with an institutional history of the petition process, drawn from an original database of over 500,000 petitions submitted to Congress from the
Founding until 1950 and previously unpublished archival materials from the First Congress. Historically, the petition process was the primary infrastructure by which individuals and minorities
participated in the lawmaking process. It was a formal process that more closely resembled litigation in a court than the tool of mass politics that petitioning has become today. The petition process
performed an important democratic function in that it afforded a mechanism of representation for
the politically powerless, including the unenfranchised. Much of what we now call the modern
“administrative state” grew out of the petition process in Congress. This Article offers three case
studies to track that outgrowth: the development of the Court of Claims, the Bureau of Pensions,
and the Interstate Commerce Commission. These case studies supplement dynamics identiﬁed
previously in the historical literature and highlight the integral role played by petitioning in the
early administrative state—a role unrecognized in most institutional histories. Rather than simply
historical, this excavation of the petition process is distinctly legal in that it aims to name the petition process and to connect it with the theory and law that structure the practice.
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Excavating the historical roots of these myriad commissions, boards, and agencies in the petition process provides a deeper functional and textual understanding of the administrative state
within our constitutional framework. First, it highlights the function of the administrative state in
facilitating the participation of individuals and minorities in lawmaking. By providing a mechanism of representation for individuals and minorities, the “participatory state” serves as an important supplement to the majoritarian mechanism of the vote. Second, it offers new historical
context against which to read the text of Article I and the First Amendment. This new interpretation could begin to calm discomfort, at least in part, held by textualists and originalists with regard
to the administrative state. Lastly, this Article offers a few examples to illustrate how this new
interpretation could provide helpful structure to our administrative law doctrine. With its concern
over procedural due process rights, administrative law largely reﬂects the quasi-due process protections offered by the Petition Clause. This Article explores two areas where the Petition Clause
could direct a different doctrinal result, arguing for a stronger procedural due process right for
petitioners of the administrative state than that offered by Mathews v. Eldridge and arguing against
the Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Chadha holding the legislative veto unconstitutional.
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introduction
[The right to petition] would seem unnecessary to be expressly provided for in
a republican government, since it results from the very nature of its structure
and institutions. It is impossible that it could be practically denied until the
spirit of liberty had wholly disappeared, and the people had become so servile
and debased as to be unﬁt to exercise any of the privileges of freemen.
– Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution (1833)1
Our government is suffering from a crisis of legitimacy.2 As James O. Freedman has described, Americans have endured a “recurrent sense of crisis” over
whether the procedures of administrative lawmaking accord with the Constitution.3 Classic legal process theory reminds us that recurring crises in the public’s
faith in our lawmaking procedure undermines the legitimacy of our laws.4 Recent scholarship by Gillian Metzger declares the administrative state to be “under
siege” across a “range of public arenas—political, judicial, and academic in particular.”5 Metzger argues that these challenges—unlike earlier challenges to the
administrative state—are frequently “surfacing in court and being framed in
terms of constitutional doctrine.”6 Moreover, the constitutional issues raised by
1.

2.

3.
4.

5.
6.

2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES BEFORE
THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION § 1894, at 645 (William S. Hein & Co., 5th ed. 1994)
(1891).
The legitimacy debate often centers not around a “thick normative notion” of legitimacy, but
that of sociological and public legitimacy. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (2005); see also Frank I. Michelman, Rawls on Constitutionalism
and Constitutional Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 394, 395 (Samuel Freeman
ed., 2003) (considering the “conditions of the possibility of political legitimacy in modern,
plural societies”); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30
CRIME & JUST. 283 (2003) (discussing how procedural fairness increases the perceived legitimacy of judicial proceedings).
JAMES O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 260 (1978).
See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of The Legal Process, 107
HARV. L. REV. 2031 (1994); see also Tom R. Tyler, Governing Amid Diversity: The Effect of Fair
Decisionmaking Procedures on the Legitimacy of Government, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 809, 809
(1994) (ﬁnding that empirical studies “strongly support the argument that procedural justice
judgments inﬂuence evaluations of the legitimacy of a national-level political institution”).
Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 8 (2017).
Id. at 9.
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these challenges are not piecemeal. Rather, the challenges frame the entire administrative state as unconstitutional.7 “While still a minority position,” Metzger
observes, “this view is gaining more judicial and academic traction than at any
point since the 1930s.”8
Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule identiﬁed this nascent movement in
charting the creation of “libertarian administrative law.”9 This strain of critique
characterizes the administrative state as an abandonment of both classical American liberalism and the core values of our “Constitution in Exile”—namely, individual rights, limited national government, and due process.10 Critics take issue
with the abandonment of the strict, tripartite separation of powers embodied in
constitutional text for the so-called “Fourth Branch”—a branch not recognized
by the text of our original Constitution.11 By Sunstein and Vermeule’s account,
the administrative state has become a lightning rod for the clash between libertarian and progressive philosophies12 in our increasingly polarized political culture.13
Given the philosophical cast of much of the critique, it is unsurprising that
it has been met with rebuttals based in intellectual history. Most recently, legal
historian Daniel R. Ernst examined the intellectual origins of the New Deal and
argued that an intellectual consensus of elites and their expressly liberal concerns
over due process should put to rest any charge that the administrative state is out
of step with liberal American values.14 Even assuming Ernst’s careful archival

7.
8.
9.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id.
Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 393
(2015). Although Sunstein and Vermeule document a recent strain of doctrine animated by
judicial critics of the administrative state, Vermeule has made clear his position that “the administrative state has never been more secure” and that any questions of administrative law
legitimacy are cabined to “elite discourse” only. Adrian Vermeule, Bureaucracy and Distrust:
Landis, Jaffe, and Kagan on the Administrative State, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2465 (2017); see
also Adrian Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, CATO UNBOUND (May 9, 2016), http://www
.cato-unbound.org/2016/05/09/adrian-vermeule/what-legitimacy-crisis [http://perma.cc
/44JE-RQ22] (“[I]t is hardly obvious that there is any widespread illegitimacy afflicting the
administrative state . . . .”).
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 402-03.
Id. at 403-09.
Id.
Notably, Sunstein and Vermeule also call for an administrative law proceduralism devoid of
politics eerily reminiscent of the process school. See id. at 466.
DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN
AMERICA, 1900-1940 (2014). Sunstein and Vermeule clothe the same moment of consensus in
constitutional theory and describe the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 as
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work could document an intellectual consensus,15 however, it is doubtful that
such a moment of agreement could overcome the core of the libertarian critique:
that is, the lack of constitutional text establishing the lawmaking procedure of
the administrative state by formal means.16
Other defenders of the administrative state have provided institutional histories undermining the libertarians’ claim that the administrative state is an alien
outgrowth of a twentieth century communitarian political philosophy foreign to
our founding constitutional culture. Jerry Mashaw,17 Theda Skocpol,18 Nicholas
Parrillo,19 Michele Dauber,20 and Daniel Carpenter,21 among others, have begun
the vital project of excavating legislative and executive practices during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This work contradicts previous descriptions of
that era as one encompassing only a weak “state of courts and parties.”22 It has
generally interrogated the mismatch between particular values previously understood as originating with the New Deal—like that of social welfare23—and the

15.
16.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

23.

an example of what William Eskridge and John Ferejohn have labeled a “superstatute”—
namely, a statute that assumes the authority of constitutional law by virtue of a strong consensus at its passage—pointing to compromise over the bill as evidence that administrative
law stripped the liberal-communitarian debate from its core. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note
9, at 466.
See Jeremy K. Kessler, The Struggle for Administrative Legitimacy, 129 HARV. L. REV. 718 (2016)
(reviewing Ernst’s book).
See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231
(1994) (“The post-New Deal administrative state is unconstitutional.”); see also PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014) (arguing the same).
JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED
YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012).
THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL
POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1995).
NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT, 1780-1940 (2013).
MICHELE LANDIS DAUBER, THE SYMPATHETIC STATE: DISASTER RELIEF AND THE ORIGINS OF
THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE (2013).
DANIEL CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATION, NETWORKS,
AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862-1928 (2001).
STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920, at 285 (1982); Daniel P. Carpenter, The Multiple and Material Legacies of Stephen Skowronek, 27 SOC. SCI. HIST. 465, 470 (2003).
In particular, Skocpol and Dauber take aim at the charge that the welfare programs of the New
Deal represent the colonization of the American mind by twentieth-century communitarianism. They offer a revisionist history that traces the origins of the welfare practices of the New
Deal to the war pensions, disaster relief, and other forms of social insurance offered readily by
early American national government. DAUBER, supra note 20; SKOCPOL, supra note 18.
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reality of historical practice. But nothing has done more to undermine the characterization of the administrative state as an alien outgrowth of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century than the work of Jerry Mashaw.
Mashaw’s impressive installments in the Yale Law Journal, later compiled into
a book, trace the practices of American administrative governance to the founding.24 Mashaw’s administrative state, if such a term still applies, is an incrementalist project that was built statute by statute as Congress met new challenges
with new forms of governance.25 His rich historical narrative problematizes the
libertarian critique that our Founding witnessed little national administrative
governance and adhered to a strict separation of powers.26 It remains unclear,
however, whether Mashaw’s account sufficiently addresses the critique that these
new forms of lawmaking procedure were never formally established. To many,
historical practice alone does not amend the Constitution.
This Article aims to build on Mashaw’s incrementalist narrative and to intervene in the debate over the legitimacy of administrative lawmaking. But unlike
these prior contributions, it grounds this intervention in the Constitution and in
constitutional text—namely, the Petition Clause of the First Amendment. Drawing on an original database of over 500,000 petitions submitted to Congress, as
well as archival materials from the First Congress, this Article excavates the petition process comprehensively for the ﬁrst time and documents how petitioning
shaped the modern administrative state. This excavation tracks petitioning in
the House of Representatives from the First Congress through the Eightieth, at
which point the volume of legislative petitioning dropped dramatically following

24.

MASHAW, supra note 17. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and “the Democracy”: Administrative Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 1829-1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568 (2008) [hereinafter Mashaw,
Administration and “the Democracy”]; Jerry L. Mashaw, The American Model of Federal Administrative Law: Remembering the First One Hundred Years, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 975 (2010);
Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age, 119 YALE L.J.
1356 (2010) [hereinafter Mashaw, Law in the Gilded Age]; Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256 (2006); Jerry L.
Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Republican
Era, 1801-1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636 (2007).
25. MASHAW, supra note 17, at 16 (“At the most general level I imagine the development of our
administrative constitution as a waltz, a three-step pattern often repeated. First, something
happens in the world. Second, public policy makers identify that happening as a problem, or
an opportunity, and initiate new forms of governmental action to take advantage of or to remedy the new situation. Third, these new forms of action generate anxieties about the direction
and control of public power. Means are thus sought to make the new initiative ﬁt within existing understandings of what it means to be accountable to law.”).
26. Id.
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implementation of the Legislative Reorganization Act and the Administrative
Procedure Act of 1946.27
In doing so, this Article offers three primary contributions to the debate.
First, it provides a revisionist history of the administrative state as an outgrowth
of the petition process by detailing congressional petitioning from the Founding
into the twentieth century. Second, it updates legal process theory to incorporate
petitioning and its integral role in affording participation for individuals and minorities in the lawmaking process. Third, this Article argues that the Petition
Clause could offer additional support for the constitutionality of the administrative state. But just as excavating the petitioning process reveals the historical and
textual roots of the administrative state, it also demonstrates that our doctrine
has migrated quite far from those origins. This history, then, also sheds lights
on how this doctrine could better reﬂect the important constitutional and democratic function that the administrative state performs in supplementing the
congressional petition process.
***
Although largely lost from our modern understanding of lawmaking, the institution of petitioning formed a core part of our Congress for much of this nation’s history. The petition process performed an important lawmaking function
within colonial legislatures in allowing the aggrieved to be heard. After the revolution, the petition process provided a mechanism of representation for individuals and minorities not represented by the majoritarian mechanism of the
vote. Even the unenfranchised could petition: women, free African Americans,
Native Americans, the foreign born, and children turned to the petition process
to participate in lawmaking.
The petition process offered the politically powerless a means of participation that was formal, public, and not driven by political power. In this way, the
petition process resembled litigation in a court more closely than the rough and
tumble public engagement process described by political scientists today. Petitioners would submit formal documents, like complaints, to trigger petition actions in Congress. The House clerk tracked these actions in a petition docket
book throughout formal proceedings—from submission to referral to reporting
to disposition. Although the petition process was primarily located in the House,

27.

In so doing, this Article challenges the widely held conclusion in the historical literature that
the petition process “died out” in the nineteenth century as a result of either the Gag Rule,
administrability problems, or other procedural changes in Congress. See Maggie L. McKinley,
Lobbying and the Petition Clause, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1131, 1153 n.146 (2016) (surveying the debate).
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the consideration of petitions dominated congressional dockets into the twentieth century—often far surpassing the volume of congressional business on other
matters.
The petition process formed an integral part of our congressional lawmaking
process until after the Second World War. The year 1945 marked not only the
end of the war, but also the beginning of a comprehensive effort to restructure a
government that had rapidly expanded under a series of wartime administrations. As part of this effort, Congress passed two laws in the summer of 1946
that fundamentally restructured the federal lawmaking process: the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 28 and the Legislative Reorganization Act (LRA). 29
Histories of the administrative state rarely treat these two statutes together,30 but
they were passed only months apart and their effects were felt in tandem. Together, these statutes dismantled the last vestiges of the petition process in Congress. In so doing, they transferred much of that existing infrastructure to the
administrative state and to the courts. In particular, the LRA reduced the number
of standing committees in Congress—once the core loci for petition review and
processing—and banned the passage of certain private bills that Congress had
used to resolve petitions. The APA transferred jurisdiction over these petitions
explicitly to the courts and the executive—most notably through the Federal Tort
Claims Act—and attempted to strengthen congressional oversight of the agencies.31 Finally, the APA codiﬁed procedural standards for the agencies to ensure
protection of the petition right, including a provision requiring a petition process in the agencies.
These two statutes did not themselves cause the decline of the petition process in Congress. Rather, they dismantled an infrastructure rendered vestigial
after Congress siphoned off the petition process into specialized boards, commissions, and agencies.32 This siphoning can be seen across a range of substantive areas, including public lands, Indian affairs, military affairs, public infrastructure, regulation and incorporation of the territories, post offices and roads,
labor, education, agriculture, immigration, and election administration.33

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

33.

Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 (1946).
See JOANNA L. GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE: ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS SINCE
THE NEW DEAL 109-152 (2014) (providing a recent and rare exception).
Id.
See infra Section I.C (“Following a steady decline in petition volume after 1914, when specialized agencies and boards mushroomed after World War I, Congress ﬁnally dismantled the
last vestiges of the congressional petition process with the passage of two statutes.”).
Id.
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Over time, the resulting assortment of boards, commissions, and agencies
has come to be pejoratively referred to as the “Fourth Branch”—denoting a mysterious entity not recognized by our tripartite constitutional structure. But, as
this Article will demonstrate, the administrative state traces its roots to constitutional text and historical practice—speciﬁcally to siphoning off of the petitioning
process—and performs many of the functions originally managed by that process.34 However, to date, there has been little research on the petition process in
Congress, and few scholars have explored the implications of this process and
the Petition Clause for the theory and law of the administrative state.
That history, recovered here, has broad implications. Most relevant for current debates over the administrative state’s legitimacy, it offers a counter-narrative to the libertarian vision of the administrative state as a rights-invading, and
even unconstitutional, construction. Instead, this history reveals an administrative state that was established, at least in part, to protect individual rights and to
maintain equal liberty by affording individuals and minorities a mechanism for
meaningful participation in the making of law. 35
This counternarrative also exposes ﬂaws in the overly simplistic model of
legal process theory. This theory of lawmaking, popularized in the 1950s and
1960s, still animates much of our public law scholarship and jurisprudence. The
libertarian vision rests on this imperfect theory. The simple legal process model
provides only a thin account of the lawmaking process and fails to capture the
necessity of facilitating equal participation to ensure equal liberty.36 In so doing,

34.

Part I details this process, but I include a brief introduction here for ease of understanding. At
the Founding and for much of this nation’s history, petitioning provided a formal means by
which anyone, including the unenfranchised, could access the lawmaking process. Women,
Native Americans, African Americans, and the foreign-born all engaged in petitioning, and
Congress provided formal consideration to all. Petitioners submitted a variety of petitions to
Congress, each comprising a formal document with a statement of grievance and a signatory
list, and often attached maps, charts, draft statutory language, and other forms of argumentation to the document. Much like a complaint ﬁled in a court, the legislative petitioning process was public: members of Congress read each petition on the ﬂoor and then referred the
petition to either the executive, an ad hoc committee, or one of the many standing committees
speciﬁc to the subject matter of the petition. Action on each petition was recorded into the
formal record of Congress, and standing committees kept dockets of action on petitions. The
authority to which the petition was referred would then issue a report on the petition with a
recommendation for resolution. Some studies place the documented reporting rate as high as
sixty or seventy percent. Congress would then take action on the report, choosing to pass a
bill, public or private, in response to the petition, or the committee might deny the petition
and take no further action. McKinley, supra note 27, at 6-7.
35. See infra Part II.
36. HART & SACKS, supra note 4; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 4, at 2050 & n.116 (noting the
near absence of any discussion of representation, elections, direct democracy, or any concern
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legal process theory perpetuates the misconception that equality and liberty are
supported only by the “rights” side of the Constitution. It overlooks how the
structural and procedural components of the lawmaking process also promote
those values.37 Scholars of critical legal studies recognized over ﬁfty years ago
that the legal process theory model of lawmaking fails to take account of the need
to accommodate and protect individuals and minorities within the lawmaking
process.38 Incorporating petitioning and other recent scholarship on the structural protection of minority participation39 into our model of lawmaking begins
to answer these longstanding criticisms.
Finally, the history of petitioning and the Petition Clause offers further support for the constitutionality of the administrative state. As I have described elsewhere, the petition right protects formal, public, and nonarbitrary access to the
lawmaking process without regard to the political power of the petitioner and
resembles the right of procedural due process in courts.40 The administrative
state and the doctrine that has developed around it already embody the Petition
Clause values of fair, public, and nonarbitrary process. 41 For textualists and
originalists, the Petition Clause could provide the textual hook necessary to calm
recurrent anxieties over administrative lawmaking. 42 For others, the Petition
Clause offers a new framework to understand the dynamics at work in Congress’s translation of the petition right into the modern state, and its historical
practice could bring clarity to administrative law doctrine more broadly.43
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces the burgeoning historical literature on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century governance and points to
disputes left unresolved by these histories. It provides context for understanding
the Petition Clause before turning to the Congressional Petitions Database. This

37.
38.
39.

40.
41.
42.
43.

with structural protections for minorities and minority representation in the original Legal
Process manuscript).
Heather K. Gerken, Windsor’s Mad Genius: The Interlocking Gears of Rights and Structure, 95
B.U. L. REV. 587, 594 & n.29 (2015).
See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 214-18 (1987); Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note 4, at 2050-51.
See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005); Heather K.
Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, 62 DUKE L.J. 1349 (2013); Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as
the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1889 (2014) [hereinafter Gerken, New Nationalism]; Gerken, supra note 37, at 594; Maria Paula Saffon & Nadia Urbinati, Procedural
Democracy, the Bulwark of Equal Liberty, 41 POL. THEORY 441, 443-45 (2013).
McKinley, supra note 27, at 1182-85.
See infra Section IV.B (noting that “the quasi-procedural due process right of the kind promised by the Petition Clause” protects values such as equality, transparency, and participation”).
See infra Section IV.A (discussing how the Petition Clause offers a textual hook for many of
the innovative forms of governance we now call the administrative state).
Id.
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Part then provides an overview of congressional petitioning from the Founding
until 1948.
Next, Part II illustrates the siphoning off of the petition process with three
case studies. The ﬁrst is roughly termed “adjudicative” and tracks the origins of
the federal claims system from the petition process to the Court of Claims and
the federal courts. The next, termed “public beneﬁts,” tracks the pension system
from the Committees on Pension to the Bureau of Pensions. The ﬁnal “regulatory” case study tracks the regulation of commerce from the Commerce and
Manufactures Committees to the executive—most notably the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Part III begins to articulate what I term the “participatory state” and situates
petitioning and the administrative state within the theoretical literature—legal
process theory, in particular—as a structural protection for minority participation in the lawmaking process.
Part IV then turns to the critics of the administrative state and shows how
their criticisms rest largely on the simple, and incomplete, tripartite separationof-powers model of legal process theory. Part IV argues that excavating the origins of the administrative state in the petition process adds nuance to these simple models and resolves concerns over the “amorphous” constitutional status of
the administrative state. Next, Part IV studies how this more nuanced model
could justify the stickiness of the legislative veto44—a procedure whereby Congress authorized one chamber to overturn administrative action—despite the Supreme Court’s holding the procedure unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha.45 In the
original petition process, a single chamber could deny a petition even in the absence of bicameralism and presentment. Furthermore, viewing the administrative state through the lens of the Petition Clause provides a textual basis for the
doctrine of administrative due process ﬁrst established in the Morgan v. United
States cases.46 Lastly, Part IV explores some potential objections before concluding.
i. origins
Why is so much attention paid to triﬂing memorials? . . . And why should we
support men at Congress to triﬂe away their time upon them?

44.

See Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273
(1993).
45. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
46. Morgan v. United States (Morgan II), 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
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The answer to questions of this kind is obvious. Justice is uniform. It is the same
when administered to an individual, a state, or a nation . . . . There is a mutual
dependence between the supreme power and the people. And since the whole
government is composed of individuals, does it appear inconsistent that individuals should be heard in the public councils? . . . In order to gain the conﬁdence of the people they must be fully convinced that their memorials and petitions will be duly attended when they are not directly repugnant to the interest
and welfare of the community. – Candidus, Gazette of the United States (June
5, 1790)47
A. The Rediscovery of Early American Lawmaking
With the publication of Building a New American State in 1982, Stephen
Skowronek issued a clarion call to scholars of politics and law to refocus their
attention not only on political history, but also on the institutions and institutional practice that operated within this history.48 The state-centered and historical turn in political science modeled by Skowronek ushered in a renaissance in
the study of early American administrative development. According to Jerry
Mashaw, this movement has transformed our understanding of “law” in the ﬁeld
of administrative law to incorporate more than the decisions of courts.49
Theda Skocpol crafted one of the earliest and undoubtedly most thorough of
these institutional histories of the administrative state in Protecting Soldiers and
Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States. 50 But while
Skocpol’s history traces the administrative state’s roots to the postbellum pension system, twenty years later, Michele Dauber pushed Skocpol’s revisionist history back to the Founding.51 In The Sympathetic State: Disaster Relief and the Origins of the Modern Welfare State, Dauber traces the disaster rhetoric used to
support relief for the Great Depression back to the First Congress and the national government’s program of disaster relief appropriations. 52 Dauber describes a disaster relief system that began with the petition process in Congress
and then expanded over time to commissions, established by general legislation,

47.

Candidus, Extract from a Speculation Signed Candidus in the Farmer’s Journal of May 27, 2 GAZETTE U.S. 477, 477 (1790).

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
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charged with resolving petitions emanating from speciﬁc disasters.53 Congress
located its power to develop these disaster relief systems in the General Welfare
Clause of the Constitution.54
Ironically, some of the institutional histories responding to Skowronek’s call
have turned these methods against Building a New American State itself—in particular, its claim that nineteenth-century America was a state of “courts and parties” devoid of administrative infrastructure. Daniel Carpenter charted the early
formation and evolution of the United States Department of Agriculture and the
United States Postal Service in The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations,
Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies 1862-1928.55 Nicholas Parrillo recently documented the salary scheme that allowed for early administrative
structures to function over loose networks of private individuals in Against the
Proﬁt Motive: The Salary Revolution in American Government, 1780-1940.56
Mashaw himself offered perhaps the strongest revisionist history against the
“courts and parties” image in his survey of early American governance. Mashaw
documents the growth of national administration—“the development and implementation of law and policy by officials speciﬁcally charged with that responsibility”—from the Founding Era until the Gilded Age.57 His revisionist narrative lays to rest the notion that the administrative state was born in 1887 with the
Interstate Commerce Commission. Across his hundred-year survey, Mashaw offers a number of case studies, including the ﬁrst Board of Patents, the land claims
system, steamboat regulation, and Civil War pensions.58
Mashaw notes that his identiﬁcation of early American administration is contingent on a necessary shift in methodology.59 In particular, his work avoids traditional event-centered administrative history and instead focuses “on practice,
structure, and policy, not on social movements, political rhetoric, or legal justiﬁcation.”60 With this inquiry, Mashaw identiﬁed “transsubstantive ideas in the
patterns of legislative and administrative action, not in the language of political
debate, academic analysis, or legal doctrines generated by judicial review.”61 It is

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id. at 19-20.
CARPENTER, supra note 21.
PARRILLO, supra note 19.
MASHAW, supra note 17, at 16.
Id. at 50, 119, 187, 256.
Id. at 3-17.
Id. at 16.
Id. (deﬁning “transsubstantive ideas” as features shared across substantive areas of the law).
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among these transsubstantive practices,62 those that predate and were codiﬁed
into the APA, that Mashaw hopes to locate administrative law or what he terms
“the internal law of administration.”63
As was the case with Dauber’s disaster relief system and Skocpol’s pension
review, Mashaw often describes these administrative practices as disparate activities that share characteristics but not a common root. In this Article, I aim to
name a transsubstantive pattern in the practice, structure, and policy of early
American lawmaking—patterns relating to petitioning. Petitioning has often occupied an unnamed but central role in the background of these institutional histories. Dauber’s ﬁrst chapter, for example, begins with a description of the “private bill” system in Congress,64 a petition system that she argues gave birth to
our welfare state. Petitions also play a recurring role in Mashaw’s survey. 65
Skocpol’s Civil War pension system derived from and operated within the petition process.66 But none of the three has wholly excavated petitioning and the
implications of this practice for understanding the development of our modern
administrative state.
My aim in naming, identifying, and exploring petitioning as a transsubstantive practice is not only historical—it is also legal. First, I aim to describe petitioning in sufficient depth to reveal it as a particular transsubstantive practice
that has been lost to our modern parlance. Our modern familiarity with voting,
for example, allows us to more clearly see patterns of relation between settings.
Thus, variations in voting practice, such as raising a hand in one setting and
marking a ballot in another, are nonetheless still seen as voting practices, and not

62.

63.
64.
65.
66.
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I offer here a friendly amendment to Mashaw’s methodological turn toward transsubstantive
ideas and patterns of action. Here, I instead focus ﬁrmly on transsubstantive practice. Akin to
the act of naming petitioning, this methodological move changes little in the substance of the
analysis. Rather, it roots Mashaw’s methodology squarely in practice theory—alongside the
works of Bourdieu, Wittgenstein, and other theorists of the structure-agency divide—where
it might gain deeper insights. See, e.g., PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE
78-79 (Richard Nice trans., 1977) (“The ‘unconscious’ is never anything other than the forgetting of history which history itself produces by incorporating the objective structures it
produces in the second natures of habitus: ‘ . . . in each of us, in varying proportions, there is
part of yesterday’s man; it is yesterday’s man who inevitably predominates in us, since the
present amounts to little compared with the long past in the course of which we were formed
and from which we result. Yet we do not sense this man of the past, because he is inveterate
in us; he makes up the unconscious part of ourselves.’” (quoting EMILE DURKHEIM, L’ÉVOLUTION PEDAGOGIQUE EN FRANCE 16 (1938))).
MASHAW, supra note 17, at 7.
DAUBER, supra note 20, at 17.
MASHAW, supra note 17, at 3-25.
SKOCPOL, supra note 18, at 102-51.
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as unrelated acts. The petition process to date has only been documented in
sparse and disparate terms—the private bill system in one setting, meeting with
a congressman in another, and petitioning an agency under the APA in yet another. Naming petitioning and giving it shape will allow us to more readily identify it across these settings, and relate the practices to their transsubstantive origins.
Second, and most important, I aim to connect this transsubstantive practice
with the theory and law that structure it.67 The founding generation saw this
process as an integral part of a republican form of government. It fostered representation of the entire demos, including the unenfranchised, and served as a
counterpoint to the majoritarian electoral process.68 From its earliest days, Congress devoted an extraordinary amount of time and resources to institutionalizing and maintaining the right to petition.69 Behind the particular transsubstantive practice of petitioning and the text of both Article I and the Petition Clause
are bodies of theory and law on which these institutional histories have yet to
reﬂect.
B. The Petition Process in Congress
In the winter of 1799, the Reverend Absalom Jones joined seventy other African American petitioners in signing and submitting to the Sixth Congress “The
Petition of the People of Colour, Freemen within the City and Suburbs of Philadelphia.”70 As was customary, the petitioners submitted the petition to their own
representative. To introduce the petition to Congress, Representative Robert
Waln of Pennsylvania read the petition aloud on the ﬂoor of the House.71 Their
petition read, in pertinent part:
The Petition of the People of Colour, Freemen within the City and Suburbs of Philadelphia— . . . . That thankful to God our Creator and to the
Government under which we live, for the blessing and beneﬁt extended
to us in the enjoyment of our natural right to Liberty, and the protection
of our Persons and property from the oppression and violence which so
great a number of like colour and National Descent are subjected . . . .

67.

McKinley, supra note 27, at 1182-86.
Id.
69. Id.
70. Nicholas P. Wood, A “Class of Citizens”: The Earliest Black Petitioners to Congress and Their
Quaker Allies, 74 WM. & MARY Q. 109, 111 (2017).
71. Id. at 136.
68.
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We are incited by a sense of Social duty and humbly conceive ourselves
authorized to address and petition you in their behalf, believing them to
be objects of representations in your public Councils, in common with
ourselves and every other class of Citizens within the Jurisdiction of the
United States, according to the declared design of the present Constitution . . . . We apprehend this solemn Compact is violated by a trade carried on in clandestine manner to the Coast of Guinea . . . .72
In the body of the petition, the petitioners identiﬁed as their grievance an illegal
slave trade market functioning off the coast of Guinea, in violation of the 1794
Slave Trade Act.73 In their “prayer” or request for resolution of their grievance,
the petitioners prayed that Congress “may exert every means in [its] power to
undo the heavy burdens, and prepare the way for the oppressed to go free.”74 As
was customary, Representative Waln then moved to refer the petition to a committee in Congress for investigation, review, and reporting.75
Although the petition garnered northern support, southern congressmen
moved quickly to block the referral and reject the petition entirely. 76 The
grounds for the motion to reject the petition might come as a surprise, however.
Rather than take issue with the race of the petitioners, the southern congressmen
raised a procedural objection: petitions to Congress were to be rejected as improperly ﬁled when the petition prayed for a remedy that fell outside of Congress’s jurisdiction.77 In addition to praying for regulation of the international
slave trade, the petitioners also prayed for regulation of domestic slavery. Regulation of slavery was widely accepted at the time as falling squarely within the
jurisdiction of the several states. In response, Representative Waln amended his
motion to direct the committee to address only those aspects of the petition
clearly within the authority of Congress—regulation of the international slave
trade.78 Recent research by historian Nicholas P. Wood has revealed that, contrary to the prevailing literature,79 the amended motion to refer the petition was
72.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Absalom Jones et al., The Petition of the People of Colour, Freemen within the City and Suburbs of Philadelphia (Dec. 30, 1799), reprinted in SIDNEY KAPLAN, THE BLACK PRESENCE IN THE
ERA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 273, 273-75 (1973).
Id.
Id.
Wood, supra note 70, at 137.
Id.
Id. at 137-38.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 113-14. Historians had mistakenly read the vote on whether to refer to a committee the
emancipation grievance of the petition, which was dismissed, as a vote on whether to refer
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“resolved in the affirmative.”80 The reviewing committees considered the grievance alleged in the petition and each reported favorably that Congress should
grant the petition.81 Both chambers of Congress agreed, and, ﬁve months following the submission of the petition, Congress drafted and passed the Slave
Trade Act of 1800,82 increasing the penalties for engaging in the slave trade and
holding liable those who participated even indirectly—including investors, employees, and the like.83
The process by which this politically powerless minority successfully advocated for reform once comprised an integral part of lawmaking in Congress.
While historians often draw on petitions as archival materials on which to base
their research, a comprehensive institutional history of the petition process has
yet to be written. The archival work required to conduct a thorough history of
the petition process in Congress has to date proved too burdensome for most
scholars of Congress and of political history. The First Congress, for example,
received approximately 600 petitions, and the historians of the First Federal
Congress Project ﬁlled two of their twenty volumes of the Documentary History
of the First Federal Congress with summaries of these petitions and their dispositions. One volume focused entirely on petitions for Revolutionary War claims.84
The original congressional petitions and supporting documents remain unpublished and often unavailable, stored on microﬁlm in the National Archives.
Moreover, these efforts catalogue only the First Congress. The volume of petitioning in later Congresses only increased, and petition records often ﬁll the archives of entire congressional committee records.
There is an alternative means to study the petition process without having
access to the original archival materials: the congressional record. From the
Founding onward, petitions submitted to Congress were read aloud on the ﬂoor,
and a summary of the petition was made part of the formal record. Collaborators
at the North American Petition Project and I have used digitized versions of the
Congressional Record and Journal to build the Congressional Petitions Database,

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

the entire petition, including all grievances. Because historians read this earlier vote as one to
dismiss the petition entirely, not simply in part, they missed the second vote, which resolved
in the affirmative the question of whether to refer the international slave trade grievance to
committee for review. Id. at 113-14, 137-38.
Id. at 138 (quoting 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 238-245 (1800)).
Id. at 138-39.
Ch. 51, § 4, 2 Stat. 70.
Wood, supra note 70, at 139.
8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 MARCH 1789-3 MARCH 1791, at 232-33 (Kenneth R. Bowling et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 8].
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a database of all petition introductions to Congress from the Founding until the
present.85 Exploration of this Database is still in its earliest stages, but it reveals
a petition process far more comprehensive, institutionalized, and enduring than
heretofore documented. The following institutional history draws in part from
this Database, supplemented with archival research into the papers of the First
Congress and secondary sources.
The petition process had deep roots in American lawmaking procedures.
While the framing generation mythologized American petitioning in Magna
Carta and the petition of right, colonial and state governments had long developed a distinctly American form of petitioning.86 Petitioning has played an integral role within legislatures throughout history.87 In Parliament, the terms bill
and petition were often used interchangeably.88 It is speculated that Parliament
itself was simply an institutionalization of the petition process.89 Petitioning was
ubiquitous throughout colonial legislatures and often drove legislative agendas.90
As I have discussed in prior work, the American colonists conceived of themselves as an unrepresented and unenfranchised minority, and they based their

85.

86.

87.
88.
89.

90.
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More on the methodology behind the Database and its limitations can be found in the Methods Appendix. But I provide a brief description here of the Database to provide context for
the sections that follow. We ﬁrst developed algorithms to locate and separate out petition introductions from the Congressional Record and Journal. We then coded these petition introductions for geographic, demographic, and topical content.
See Christine A. Desan, Remaking Constitutional Tradition at the Margin of the Empire: The Creation of Legislative Adjudication in New York, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 257 (1998) (documenting
the usurpation of public claims adjudication by colonial legislatures as a distinctly American
constitutional innovation); see also Daniel Carpenter, Democracy by Petition 1-68 (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with author) (documenting the rise of a distinct form of American petitioning, the spread of participatory democracy, and the abolition of aristocracy in the
antebellum era correlating with a ubiquitous peak in petitioning activity).
Id. at 1142-47 (chronicling the extensive use of petitioning from Magna Carta to the early Republic).
K. Smellie, Right of Petition, in 12 ENCYLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 98, 98 (Edwin R.A.
Seligman ed., 1937).
Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for a Redress of Grievances: Cut from a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 20-21 (1993) (outlining the
centrality of petitioning in Parliament).
Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A Short History of the Right To Petition the Government for Redress
of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142 (1986).
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claimed right to a distinct American sovereignty in the Declaration of Independence on the failure of the petitioning process.91 The founding generation then
codiﬁed protection of the petition right into their constitutions, both state and
federal.92 The right protected by the Petition Clause was strictly procedural. It
protected a right not to a particular legislative outcome, but a right to equal, formal, and public access to the lawmaking process akin to the right of procedural
due process.93
The petition process also provided an underappreciated avenue for political
participation distinct from the vote. The process was available to even the unenfranchised and did not operate by a majoritarian decision rule. Through the petition process, aggrieved individuals and minorities could articulate their grievances and pray for redress, even in the absence of a particular cause of action.94
The mechanism of American petitioning was thus open to equal participation by
all—politically powerful and powerless alike. The unenfranchised—women, Native Americans, and non-enslaved African Americans—were afforded process on
par with franchised petitioners. Congress received, before the end of the Civil
War, a steady inﬂux of petitions submitted by the unenfranchised. From 1789
until 1865, of 145,892 total petitions, Congress introduced 10,131 petitions
(6.9%) submitted by primary signatories who were unenfranchised. Of these
10,131, women submitted 9,258 petitions (91.38%),95 Native Americans submitted 569 petitions (5.62%), foreign nationals submitted 180 petitions (1.78%),
and African Americans submitted 124 petitions (1.22%). 96 Because Congress
91.

92.

93.
94.
95.

96.

McKinley, supra note 27, at 1142-43 (citing THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 4 (U.S.
1776) (“In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury.”)).
Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Signiﬁcance of the Right To Petition,
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153, 2199-2212 (1998) (recounting the constitutionalization of the right
to petition in state and federal constitutions).
McKinley, supra note 27, at 1145 (explaining how the petition process increased political access
for otherwise marginalized groups).
Id.
Not only were the petitions themselves an important and effective lawmaking technology for
the unenfranchised, the act of petitioning often caused second-order effects on unenfranchised communities and empowered later, more comprehensive petitioning campaigns. See
Daniel Carpenter & Colin D. Moore, When Canvassers Became Activists: Antislavery Petitioning
and the Political Mobilization of American Women, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 479 (2014).
These ﬁgures are drawn from the Congressional Petitions Database. They likely understate
the number of petitions that included participation of the unenfranchised, because the data
include only those petitions where an unenfranchised petitioner was listed as the primary petitioner and the member petition introduction noted the demographics of the petitioner. Aggregating the unenfranchised from petition introductions would not capture all of the petitions where an unenfranchised petitioner was one of many signers. It also bears noting that
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treated petitions from the unenfranchised like all other petitions and did not demarcate them in any way, they are challenging to track in the record and these
numbers are likely quite understated.
The relative political power and characteristics of any individual petitioner
did not drive petition procedure, nor did petitions with fewer signatures receive
different or lesser process. The petition process thus afforded a means of participation for the politically powerless. The process was also formal. Parliamentary
rules governed the procedure by which petitions were received, investigated, and
reported, and a petitioner knew the process to expect in response to a petition.
Like a court, the clerk’s office in the House kept a docket book that tracked each
petition from submission to reporting to disposition. Finally, the petition process in Congress was presumed to be a public process. All petition introductions
were read in full on the ﬂoor, making them part of the formal legislative record,
and subsequent action on a petition was similarly recorded.97 Petitioning served
a vital role in lawmaking and ensured a more egalitarian form of participation in
the lawmaking process.
C. The Infrastructure of Petitioning
The practice of petitioning developed by Parliament and reﬁned in the colonial and state legislatures formed an early and important aspect of lawmaking in
the First Congress. Indeed, petitioning constituted such a fundamental component of lawmaking that the establishment and formalization of the petition process occurred less than one week after the House of Representatives achieved its
ﬁrst quorum on April 1, 1789. 98 Before the ratiﬁcation of the Seventeenth
Amendment, the popularly elected House was closer to the electorate, and it remains to this day the sole originator of revenue bills—a common resolution of
petitioners’ grievances. Not surprisingly, the House also quickly became the primary chamber for the bulk of petitioning activity.99 On April 6, 1789, both chambers of Congress met to count the votes of the Electoral College and conﬁrm the
election of George Washington as the ﬁrst President of the United States.100 The
procedures governing petitioning were reported on the second page of the

97.
98.

99.
100.

these ﬁgures do not capture white male non-landholders who were also excluded from the
franchise.
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 8, supra note 84.
1 A Record of the Reports of Select Committees of the House of Representatives of the United
States (1789) (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with the National Archives, Index to Committee Reports, Executive Reports, 1st Congress, 2d Session, Record Group 233.2) [hereinafter A Record of the Reports of Select Committees].
Id.
Id.
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House Record of the Reports of Select Committees, the record documenting
Congress’s earliest parliamentary procedures. Only several pages later did the
House address such fundamental procedures as how to present bills to the President for signature or establish conference committees. The ﬁrst executive departments—State, War, and Treasury, respectively—were established even later.
The petition process established by the First Congress resembled more
closely the formalized and routinized litigation of a court than a tool of mass
politics. Of note, this newly institutionalized petition process embodied the values of transparency and fairness found in judicial procedure. Each petition submitted to a member of Congress or the clerk would be “introduced” into Congress. Under the newly established parliamentary procedures in the House, the
Speaker or a member in his place would present a petition on the day of its introduction:
Petitions, memorials, and other papers addressed to the House shall be
presented through the Speaker, or by a member in his place, and shall
not be debated or decided on the day of their being ﬁrst read, unless
where the House shall direct otherwise, but shall lie on the table, to be
taken up in the order they were read.101
To introduce a petition, the Speaker or member would read the entire petition
on the House ﬂoor. Following this full recitation, a summary of the petition
would become part of the House Journal, the record of Congress published regularly and made available for the public. Then the petition would be “tabled”—
or held in the queue, seemingly without time limit—to be taken up for further
consideration in the order the petition was received.102
Following introduction, petitioning followed a standard four-stage process:
referral, investigation, reporting, and disposition. Petitions were most often referred to a committee within Congress with jurisdiction over the petition or, alternatively, to the executive, most commonly the Secretary of the Treasury or the
Secretary of War, for investigation of the grievances alleged in the petition.
Within Congress, committees—either standing or select—became the locus of
petition processing.103 Following referral, the committee or executive official to
101.

Id.
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 8, supra note 84, at xvi.
103. From the First Congress, the petition process shaped lawmaking infrastructure within the
Congress—largely through the development of ad hoc and standing committees. See Tobias
Resch et al., Petitions and the Legislative Committee Formation: Theory and Evidence from
Revolutionary Virginia and the Early U.S. House 24 (Jan. 3, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.loc.gov/loc/kluge/news/pdf/CongressHistory-PetitionsCommitteeFormation
_SchneerReschCarpentrMcKinley.pdf [http://perma.cc/59MS-RMXT]. The process also
102.
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whom the petition was referred would conduct an investigation and complete a
report that included factual and legal ﬁndings and a recommended disposition,
all of which were recorded in full in the record for select committees or for each
standing committee.104 Following the issuance of such a report, either a subcommittee within Congress or a committee of the whole—a committee consisting of
the entire membership of one chamber—would then review the report and decide on the disposition, including proposing a bill or resolution to redress the
petitioner’s grievance.105
Petitions themselves were drafted as formal documents that resembled a
complaint. Each petition followed certain conventions of form and structure—
including an addressee (a petition title summarizing the names of the petitioners); a petition topic (a formal statement of grievance outlining the issue at
hand); a prayer for relief; and a signature list.106
The archival records for the First Congress reveal an even more institutionalized and formalized petition process than the parliamentary procedures of each
chamber betray. Beginning with the First Congress, the House of Representatives maintained a detailed docket of all petitions submitted, sorted by session
and by Congress.107 Published for the ﬁrst time in the pages that follow, the petition docket of the First Congress, like a court docket, tracked all important procedural considerations of the petition. These included the date the petition was

104.
105.
106.

107.

deﬁed modern notions of separation of powers with ready reliance on the executive and the
courts.
Id. at 19.
A Record of the Reports of Select Committees, supra note 98; DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL.
8, supra note 84, at xvii.
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 8, supra note 84, at xviii-xix. Each petition would often begin
by stating to whom the petition was addressed—the House of Representatives or the Senate,
for example—and failure to state the correct addressee was grounds to refuse to receive a petition entirely. The prayer for relief was then expected to state the speciﬁc relief sought in clear
and detailed terms. Failure to include sufficient detail articulating the speciﬁc relief requested
could result in Congress’s treating the petition as “informational” only. Petitioning Congress
also required deferential language. Throughout the statement of grievance and prayer, the
petition’s text was expected to be respectful, and the failure to frame the petition in sufficiently
deferential language was often a means to challenge receipt of the petition. The statement of
grievance and prayer would then be followed by a signatory list that could range from a “list”
of a single signature to one including hundreds of thousands of signatures. Id. at xix-xx.
An Alphabetical List of Petitions Presented to the House of Representatives from the Commencement of the First Congress to the End of the Second Session of the Third Congress with
the Proceedings Thereon (1789) (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with the National Archives, Petition Book, 1st Congress, 1st Session - 3d Congress, 2d Session, Record Group 233).
Committees, standing and select, also kept similar petition dockets within their own record
books.

1562

petitioning and the making of the administrative state

presented, the petitioners’ identities, the date and location of the petition referral, the report date, additional procedures after the report was issued, and the
disposition. Within the docket book sections, petitions were listed alphabetically
by the organizational name or surname of the primary petitioner. The petition
docket listed petitions from unenfranchised petitioners in exactly the same manner as all other petitioners and without demarcation. Although each petition was
docketed by Congress and by session, the petition book detailed future action on
each petition across Congresses.
The investigation and reporting practices for processing petitions involved
detailed and thorough factﬁnding. Reports on petitions ranged from succinct
partial-page reports stating that the grievance alleged in the petition was barred
by a statute of limitations to reports in excess of ten pages, with detailed charts,
calculations, and factual ﬁndings.108
Each stage of the petition process complicates our modern view of what legislatures do—namely, make laws. More often than not, processing petitions involved an amalgam of legislating, adjudicating, and enforcing. For example, one
of the ﬁrst reports issued by a select committee addressed two petitions for intellectual property protection submitted by John Churchman and David Ramsay
and received within weeks of the convening of the First Congress.109 In response,
the House formed one of its earliest select committees, which issued a report ﬁve
days following referral.110 In the report, the committee mentions speciﬁcally that
it conferred with at least one of the petitioners, Churchman, in formulating the
approximately one-page report, which was recorded into the formal log for the
select committees of the House. In this way, the petition process in Congress
blended legislative and adjudicative functions, and resembled proceedings in a
court more closely than the purely political forces we imagine animate the lawmaking process.
The petition process therefore qualiﬁes our modern view of Article I lawmaking. Decisions on petitions created a wide array of “laws”—general laws, private laws, individual commission decisions, and decisions by congressional committees. Resolution of petitions at times involved passing public laws through
the traditional means of bicameralism and presentment.111 But more often, resolving a petition involved what would today be perceived as nontraditional lawmaking—processes which at the Founding were viewed as equally within Congress’s power to control. To illustrate, petition declinations were not considered
108.

A Record of the Reports of Select Committees, supra note 98.
Id.; DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 8, supra note 84, at xi-xxvii.
110. A Record of the Reports of Select Committees, supra note 98.
111. Id.
109.
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“legislative acts” that would require bicameralism and presentment.112 If the report on a petition recommended against redressing the petitioner’s grievance—
or was “reported against,” to use the parlance of the period—Congress often deferred to the committee or executive’s expertise and declined to act on the petition.113 Denial of a petition’s request for resolution of grievance did not require
the passage of any law. Committees therefore issued declinations without the
passage of any bill, thereby avoiding the requirements of bicameralism and presentment.114 Committees also occasionally provided the petitioner the opportunity to withdraw petitions that were improperly ﬁled or were suspected as
fraudulent.115
Favorable disposition of pending petitions most often took one of two forms.
If the report recommended redress of the petitioner’s grievance, the committee
would often propose a bill or resolution that Congress would pass through the
traditional lawmaking procedures of bicameralism and presentment. Alternatively, Congress could employ the unique authority held at the Founding to pass
“private laws,” or laws that applied to a single individual or case—much like a
court judgment. The chosen method depended on the grievance alleged and the
relief prayed for in the petition. While private laws were commonly used to redress petitions for claims, pensions, contracts, intellectual property, and other
government beneﬁts,116 the relationship between petitions and private laws was
complex. The earlier mentioned Ramsay and Churchman petitions for intellectual property provide a helpful illustration of this relationship.
Following issuance of the committee report on the Ramsay and Churchman
petitions, the House ﬁrst initiated debate on the report. After that debate, where
portions of the report were “tabled” or left to be resolved by future committees,
the House consented to the report.117 It is unclear why the House declined to
adopt the legislative practice common in the states, under which private bills
would have granted Ramsay and Churchman intellectual property protection for

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

117.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 8, supra note 84, at xi-xxvii.
See List of the Private Acts of Congress, in 6 THE PUBLIC STATUTES AT LARGE OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA FROM THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT IN 1789; TO MARCH 3, 1845
iii (Richard Peters ed., 1848); see also id. at 943-91 (compiling an index of the beneﬁciaries and
purposes of private laws).
Edward C. Walterscheid, Charting a Novel Course: The Creation of the Patent Act of 1790, 25
AIPLA Q.J. 445, 458 (1997).
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their described inventions. However, the House had from its very ﬁrst days expressed concerns over its capacity to process petitions on a case-by-case basis.118
Instead of simply granting the petitioners the relief they sought, the House appointed another committee on April 20, 1789—just 19 days following the ﬁrst
quorum—to draft and bring a bill or bills for a public law, “making a general
provision for securing authors and inventors the exclusive right of their respective writings and discoveries.”119
Two months later, the committee reported out a bill that would form the
basis for the ﬁrst Patent Act, signed into law on April 10, 1790 by President
George Washington. The Act established the general infrastructure for patent
protection and, speciﬁcally, it established a three-member commission to resolve
petitions for patents that would exist independent of the petition process in Congress.120 These early intellectual property petitions illustrate how Congress addressed petitions focused on individual interests not only through private bills
but also by establishing new structures of governance through general legislation.
An in-depth examination of the petition procedures in the early Congresses
complicates our simple notions of the legislative process. The petition process
began and was institutionalized in earnest within the ﬁrst days of Congress. Rather than a simple process of members introducing and passing bills through
deliberation, bicameralism, and presentment, lawmaking in Congress was incredibly complex. Members could introduce bills, but the public engaged in the
lawmaking process also and suggested bills through their petitions. The investigation and reporting aspects of the petition process involved functions that
looked more adjudicatory than legislative. The processing of exceptions and
working out the nuanced application of general laws looked more executive.
Moreover, Congress began to build out the infrastructure of the petition process

118.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 8, supra note 84, at xv.
119. Walterscheid supra, note 117, at 458. During its deliberations on the Patent Act, Congress continued to receive petitions for patent protection, but these petitions were tabled until Congress
passed the Patent Act and the petitioners submitted their petitions pursuant to the terms of
the Act. Thereby, Congress dealt with the petitions in aggregate by establishing infrastructure
to resolve petitions of that kind in the future. The national government did not begin to resolve petitions for patents until July 30, 1790, when it granted the ﬁrst federal patent to Samuel Hopkins of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. President Washington and two Patent Commission members signed Hopkins’s patent and, unlike the grant of an intellectual property
monopoly through a private bill, the grant did not require bicameralism and presentment. See
P.J. Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y. 237, 244-45 (1936).
120. Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109. This independent commission comprised the Secretary of War,
the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General. It could approve a patent with the approval
of two of its members and later formed the basis for the Patent and Trademark Office. Id.
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into the other branches. In addition to relying upon the other branches for factﬁnding and administration, Congress began to establish entirely new structures
of governance to resolve petitions. The next Sections will give a better sense of
the volume of the petition process and show how it dominated Congress’s docket
for decades.

1566

petitioning and the making of the administrative state
FIGURE 1.
PETITION DOCKET BOOK COVER – FIRST CONGRESS TO THIRD CONGRESS, 1789
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FIGURE 2.
PETITION DOCKET BOOK – SECOND CONGRESS, 1791-1793

D. The Rise and Fall of Congressional Petitioning
1. Petitioning the Early Congress (1789-1795)
The petition process had already been ﬁrmly institutionalized in colonial and
state legislatures by the time that the First Congress cracked open the doors of
the just-renovated Federal Hall in New York City in early spring of 1789.121 Petitioners had climbed the steps of Federal Hall before when it served as the meeting place of the Confederation Congress.122 The Articles of Confederation had
established a petition process of its own, and the Confederation Congress often

121.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 8, supra note 84, at xvi-xvii; FERGUS M. BORDEWICH, THE FIRST
CONGRESS: HOW JAMES MADISON, GEORGE WASHINGTON, AND A GROUP OF EXTRAORDINARY
MEN INVENTED THE GOVERNMENT 25-26 (2016).
122. BORDEWICH, supra note 121, at 2.
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worked closely with the executive to resolve certain petitions.123 Following ratiﬁcation of the new Constitution, petitioners wasted no time in navigating this
familiar terrain to submit their petitions to the new Federal Congress.
The First Congress received 621 petitions: 598 to the House and 23 to the
Senate.124 The House continued to receive the majority of petitions—an average
of 78% of the petition volume—over the next one hundred and ﬁfty years, from
the First Congress (1789-1791) to the Eightieth (1947-1949).125
Petitions in the early Congresses alleged grievances on a range of issues, and
the process deﬁed modern notions of separation of powers from its earliest days.
From the First Congress to the end of the ﬁrst session of the Fourth Congress,
1,887 petitions were introduced. 126 Of these 1,887 petitions, the majority addressed the military (63.17%) and administration (non-military) (17.91%).127
But the petitions also included commercial petitions (9.64%), and a handful of
miscellaneous petitions (5.14%) on subjects ranging from abolition to admission
of Vermont as a state to maritime issues.128 Before the establishment of standing
committees, Congress referred a majority of these petitions—1,004 (53.22%)—
to the executive for review, investigation, and reporting. Congress directed approximately 97% of these executive referrals to the Secretary of Treasury or the
Secretary of War. Congress referred the balance of these early petitions, or 647
(34.29%), to select committees or one of the two early standing committees—
elections and claims. Congressional committees and the executive took the referral of a petition quite seriously. Once referred, the executive returned a report in

123.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., PETITIONS, MEMORIALS AND
OTHER DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF CONGRESS, MARCH 4, 1789 TO
DECEMBER 14, 1795, at 5-6 (Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter COMM. ON ENERGY REPORT]. This
1986 report undertaken by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce to study the origins of the Committee on Commerce and Manufactures—the original predecessor of the
Committee on Energy and Commerce, established on December 14, 1795—sheds light on how
the House responded to the volume of early petitioning. The report expands on the work of
the First Federal Congress Project to examine petitioning in the House for the ﬁrst three Congresses and a portion of the Fourth Congress. Id.
These data are drawn from the Congressional Petitions Database, comparing the Senate data
to the volume in the House.
Id.
COMM. ON ENERGY REPORT, supra note 123, at 362 tbl.II.
Id.
Id. As for the disposition of these diverse petitions, the vast majority received some substantive
response. Congress “tabled” a minority of petitions (11.76%), a procedure used when Congress determined that a petition addressed matters outside its jurisdiction or needed to postpone consideration. It rejected or gave leave to withdraw only a small sliver of petitions
(0.74%), procedures used when petitions were procedurally inadequate, improperly ﬁled, or
believed to be fraudulent. Id. at 361 tbl.I.
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response to 71.61% of petitions referred and congressional committees reported
at a rate of 60.90%.
2. The Congressional Petitions Database
Identifying trends in the over 500,000 petitions introduced to Congress during the twenty Congresses convened between the Founding and 1980 presents a
considerable challenge. The petition process underwent repeated changes as
Congress redirected petitions on particular topics toward specialized commissions and boards. The story of the petition process that follows focuses on
changes in volume. A preliminary analysis of the House, the chamber that handled the lion’s share of petitions, reveals a petition process that grew in volume
and scope steadily over 150 years, and then essentially disappeared from Congress in the late 1940s. Amidst a growing population, an increase in federal
power, and a reduction in communication costs, the petition volume in Congress
grew. However, rather than growing in leaps and bounds after the Civil War,
volume adjusted for population stabilized. Then, in the late 1940s, the petition
volume in Congress dropped to near-zero levels, where it has remained until
modern day. The following Sections describe this growth and then offer an explanation for the disappearance.
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FIGURE 3.
HOUSE PETITION VOLUME, FIRST THROUGH ONE-HUNDREDTH CONGRESSES
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FIGURE 4.
HOUSE PETITIONS PER 100,000 POPULATION, 1789-1980

With respect to overall trends, the House saw an increase in volume from
598 petition introductions at the Founding to 14,957 in the 62nd Congress (19111913), which roughly tracked the growth of population in the United States from
4 million at the Founding to approximately 92 million in 1910. Following the
62nd Congress (1911-1913), however, petitioning in the House began a period of
decline and never again saw the peaks in volume it experienced in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Major wars, including the Civil War (37th38th Congress, 1861-1865), World War I (63rd-65th Congress, 1914-1918), and
World War II (76th-78th Congress, 1939-1945), generally saw a decline in the
volume of petition introductions as both Congress and the population turned
their attention to more pressing matters.
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FIGURE 5.
MEAN PETITION INTRODUCTION BY PHASE PER 100,000 POPULATION

With respect to speciﬁc trends, it is helpful to divide the petition volume in
Congress into four distinct phases.129 The ﬁrst phase (1789-1861) saw an overall
increase in petition volume from the First Congress until the 62nd Congress, as
the population of the United States grew and its jurisdiction expanded west. Following a lull in petition introductions during the Jeffersonian era and the War
of 1812, the volume kept pace with, and often increased faster than the rate of
population growth during this period. This phase also saw one of the highest
peaks in petition volume. During the 25th Congress (1837-1839) abolitionists

129.

These four phases are a simpliﬁed version of the phases outlined in the Final Report of the
Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure that tracks the growth of “ABC”
agencies over time. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO. 8, at 1-11 (1st Sess. 1941). There, the Committee described the
“growth of the administrative agencies” in ﬁve phases: from “1789 to the close of the Civil
War”; from “1865 to the turn of the century”; from “1900 to the end of the World War”; from
“1918 to the beginning of the depression of 1929”; and from “1930 to 1940.” Id. To better see
trends in the volume panel data that also tracked the growth of formal administrative agencies, I adopted these phases in a consolidated form. Such consolidation better illustrated
trends in the panel data without unnecessary duplication and allowed me to examine data past
the 1941 publication date of the report.
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submitted over 4,000 petitions in response to the Gag Rule, a resolution enacted
by the House to table all petitions submitted on the subject of slavery, which had
just gone into effect. Many legal historians have argued that the Gag Rule ended
the petition process in Congress,130 but as the panel data show, petition volume
in fact continued to grow for the next hundred years.
The second phase (1862-1914) lasted from the Civil War until World War I.
Per capita petition volume largely maintained the levels seen previously, but with
slightly less variation. This phase saw a number of peaks in petition volume due
to high-volume petition campaigns on particular issues of public concern. The
Industrial Revolution and lowered communication costs likely contributed to a
qualitative change in the petition process during this period, as campaigns were
better coordinated and able to organize mass responses to fashionable issues of
the day. For example, petition volume during the 52nd Congress (1891-1893),
which saw an all-time high of 16,206 petition introductions, was largely driven
by a petition campaign over whether the four-hundred-year celebration of the
discovery of the Americas, the Columbus Exposition, would open its doors on a
Sunday.
The third phase (1915-1945) was a period of signiﬁcant decline in per capita
petition volume from the levels of the last two phases. This phase also saw the
greatest level of growth in the administrative state as Congress created more than
double the number of agencies seen before 1915. The four-year period from 1934
to 1938 saw more than thirty-eight “alphabet agencies” created as part of the
New Deal. As petitioners turned to specialized agencies and boards for relief,
petitioning appears to have changed qualitatively in Congress as well. As with
the second phase, volume during this period continued to be driven by highvolume campaigns on matters of public concern.
The fourth and ﬁnal phase began in 1947, with the 80th Congress. This
phase witnessed a precipitous decline in petitioning campaigns. It began with
the implementation of the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act, which transformed the committee system in Congress, banned the passage of private bills
often used to resolve petitions, and transferred jurisdiction over the most common topics of petitions to the courts and the executive. Two hundred years after
130.

See, e.g., David C. Frederick, John Quincy Adams, Slavery, and the Disappearance of the Right of
Petition, 9 LAW & HIST. REV. 113 (1991); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Downsizing the Right
To Petition, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 739, 751 (1999); Higginson, supra note 90, at 158-65. The volume of petitions on a range of matters from public to private continued to grow in the House
following the Gag Rule. In fact, Congress witnessed steady petition campaigns on public matters into the twentieth century, when petitions on private matters declined in Congress and
increased within the agencies and the courts. Recent scholarship in legal history and political
science has begun to chip away at the widespread belief that the congressional petition process
died out after the Gag Rule. Data from the Congressional Petitions Database should ﬁnally
put this theory to rest.
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the Founding, and with a population that now exceeded 131 million, the 100th
Congress saw the introduction of only 241 petitions into the House, half the
number introduced to the House during the Founding Congress.
3. The Legislative Reorganization Act and the Administrative Procedure Act
of 1946
Following a steady decline in petition volume after 1914, when specialized
agencies and boards mushroomed during and after World War I, Congress ﬁnally dismantled the last vestiges of the congressional petition process with the
passage of two statutes in the summer of 1946: the Legislative Reorganization
Act131 and the Administrative Procedure Act.132 These Acts put an end to the
congressional petition process. In particular, the LRA reduced the standing committees in Congress, which had been the loci of petition processing, and granted
jurisdiction over these petitions to the executive and to the courts. The APA ensured procedural protections for petitioners in the agencies, while the LRA positioned Congress as the watchdog of those procedural protections.
The APA is inarguably the most researched and litigated statute governing
the administrative state. To date, however, the relationship between the Administrative Procedure Act and the petition process has received little attention.133
This omission is all the more surprising given the Act’s explicit tethering to the
petition process. The APA directly extended the right of petition to the agencies,
and it codiﬁed certain procedures that resembled the petition process in Congress. In particular, the Act protected the right to petition directly in the context
of rulemaking, requiring all agencies to “accord any interested person the right
to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule,” and requiring agencies to provide prompt notice for the denial of any petition.134
There is evidence that the Petition Clause itself motivated inclusion of this
provision. The legislative history prepared by the Senate cites the Petition Clause

131.

Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 (1946).
132. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
133. The rare administrative history that treats these two statutes together, authored by legal historian Joanna Grisinger, has recognized that Congress envisioned the two statutes as complementary. GRISINGER, supra note 30, at 109-52. In particular, she recalls the Administrative
Procedure Act as an effort to bring procedural due process into the administrative state and to
foster oversight of that due process through judicial review. She describes the Legislative Reorganization Act as the legislative counterpart to that judicial oversight and an effort to provide Congress with the infrastructure necessary to provide similar oversight. Id. No history to
date, however, has discussed the connection between the two Acts and the petition process.
134. Pub. L. No. 79-404, §§ 4, 6, 60 Stat. at 241.
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explicitly as the basis for the provision.135 The Final Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administration, heralded at the time as “undoubtedly the
most thorough and comprehensive study ever made of Federal administrative
procedure,”136 recommended inclusion of a formal petition process as part of an
overall scheme to strengthen public participation within the rulemaking process.137
Notice and comment rulemaking itself embodies the petition right indirectly.
The Final Report of the Attorney General found that much of the administrative
state, rather than responding to individual petitions on rules, had begun to announce proposed regulations in advance and to hold public hearings before issuance. The APA did not invent new practices for administrative procedures out
of whole cloth; rather, the Act aimed to reaffirm the best procedures already at
work in some corners of the administrative state. At the recommendation of the
Attorney General’s Report,138 the APA required that agencies provide notice to
the public of a proposed rule and “give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments,” either in a public hearing or otherwise.139 Thus, the Act codiﬁed procedures that had originated in the petition process.
While the APA transformed the administrative state, the comparatively understudied LRA transformed Congress. During the last throes of World War II,
Congress created the ﬁrst Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress to
draft a bill that would fundamentally restructure Congress and the lawmaking
process.140 Formation of the Joint Committee was a response to concerns that
the administrative state was handling the bulk of public affairs with little or no

135.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

S. DOC. NO. 79-248, at 21 (1946) (“One agency objects to the statutory statement of a right of
petition on the ground that it would ‘force’ a ‘tremendous’ number of hearings. The alternative implied is that no one should have a right of petition, leaving action or inaction to the
initiative of the agency concerned. Even Congress, under the Bill of Rights, is required to
accord the right of petition to any citizen. If a petitioner states and supports a valid ground
for hearing or relief, manifestly he should be entitled to hearing or relief. Not every petition
need result in a hearing, just as not every complaint need result in trial.”).
James Hart, Final Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, 35 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 501, 501 (1941).
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. DOC.
NO. 8, at 1-202 (1st Sess. 1941).
Id. at 105-08.
5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS, S. REP. NO. 79-1011,
at 1 (1946).
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congressional oversight. 141 After thorough investigation, the Joint Committee
declared that “the real workshop” of Congress142—that is, the committees—had
stalled due to a muddled and overly complex committee structure.143
To afford members “time properly to weigh and consider legislative matters
referred” to the committees, the report recommended reducing the standing
committees in the Senate from thirty-three to sixteen and from forty-eight to
eighteen in the House.144 It suggested limitations on how many committees each
member could join. Finally, it supported an appropriation to expand legislative
infrastructure, including a permanent staff to assist each committee, a legislative
counsel’s office to assist in drafting, and a research service to provide unbiased
research support.145 According to the report, the increased staff was necessary to
prevent the practice of borrowing specialized executive staff—which had become
increasingly prevalent within congressional committees—and to stem the tide of
bills drafted by the executive—which the Joint Committee estimated at over half
of all bills introduced to Congress.146
The Joint Committee shaped the LRA to accomplish two primary ends. The
ﬁrst was to refocus congressional attention toward national matters.147 To address this issue, the LRA banned the private bills that had long served as a means

141.

142.

143.

144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. (“Our committee was created in response to a widespread congressional and public belief
that a grave constitutional crisis exists in which the fate of representative government itself is
at stake. Public affairs are now handled by a host of administrative agencies headed by nonelected officials with only casual oversight by Congress. The course of events has created a
breach between government and the people . . . . Under these conditions, it was believed, the
time is ripe for Congress to reconsider its role in the American scheme of government and to
modernize its organization and procedures.”).
Id. at 2 (“About 90 percent of all the work of the Congress on legislative matters is carried on
in these committees. Most bills recommended by congressional committees become laws of
the land and the content of legislation ﬁnally passed is largely determined in the committees.”).
Standing committees mushroomed to a total of eighty-one: thirty-three in the Senate and
forty-eight in the House with overlapping and unclear jurisdictions. Id. Committee surveys
revealed that members were stretched thin between the work of these committees, as many
members of the Senate served on upwards of seven to ten committees, and members of the
House served on as many as six or more committees. Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 3-18.
Id. at 11.
92 CONG. REC. 10048 (1946) (statement of Rep. Michener); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON THE
ORG. OF CONG., LEGISLATIVE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1946, at 7 (Comm. Print 1974) (“Congress is overburdened by many local and private matters which divert its attention from national policy making and which it ought not to have to consider. It functions as a common
council for the District of Columbia. It serves as a tribunal for the settlement of private claims.
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of resolving petitions for private claims, pension bills, bridge bills, and other local and private legislation.148 Further, the law reduced the number of standing
committees in Congress and transferred jurisdiction over those petitions to the
executive or the courts. The Act also addressed the informal method of public
engagement in the lawmaking process that had come to ﬁll the void of the petition process in Congress: lobbying. In its draft bill, the Joint Committee included the ﬁrst proposed lobbying regulations at the federal level—the Federal
Regulation of Lobbying Act—that designed a registration and disclosure regime
for professional federal lobbyists.149
The second primary purpose of the LRA was to create infrastructure within
Congress for oversight of the agencies, including the petition process that Congress had transferred to the executive. To this end, the LRA matched the consolidated committee structure in Congress to the exact structure and jurisdiction of
the administration.150 For example, the Committees on Pensions, Invalid Pensions, and World War Veterans’ Legislation were consolidated into a Committee
on Veterans’ Affairs, an analogue to the United States Department of Veterans
Affairs.151 The LRA also expanded the committees’ enforcement power by increasing investigative and subpoena capacity, and it recommended charging the
restructured committees “to conduct a continuous review of the laws originally
reported by the committees.”152 Finally, in the event that it was not wholly clear,
the LRA included an explicit charge that the consolidated standing committees
should provide ongoing oversight of the administration.153

148.
149.

150.

151.
152.
153.

It spends much time on pension bills, the construction of bridges over navigable waters, and
other private and local matters. . . . Congressmen are also handicapped by a host of routine
chores for constituents which they are glad to perform, but which leave them little time for
adequate study of national legislative problems.”).
Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 131, 60 Stat. 812, 831 (1946).
Id. at §§ 301-11, 60 Stat. at 814, 839. The bill also established self-government for the District
of Columbia, provided each member with administrative support for constituent services, and
established a private commission to resolve correction of military records, among other provisions. Id. at § 207, 60 Stat. at 837 (military records).
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMM. ON THE ORG. OF CONG., S. REP. NO. 79-1400, at 6 (1946)
(“The reconstructed standing committees will, it is hoped, roughly parallel the reorganized
administrative structure of the executive branch of the Government and will be utilized as
vehicles of consultation and collaboration between Congress and the corresponding administrative agencies within their respective jurisdictions.”); id. at §§ 102, 121, 60 Stat. at 814, 822.
Id.
S. REP. NO. 79-1011, supra note 140, at 6.
Section 136 of the Act provided: “To assist the Congress in appraising the administration of
the laws and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary,
each standing committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws,
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Together, the LRA and the APA redeﬁned the petition process. They dismantled petition infrastructure in Congress, transferred jurisdiction over the remaining petition volume to the executive and the courts, and restructured Congress
to serve as overseer. However, these two statutes merely erased the last vestiges
of a process that had largely relocated elsewhere. Petition volume had already
been steadily declining since 1914, when Congress began in earnest to build the
modern state and transfer jurisdiction over increasing numbers of petitions from
congressional committees into various commissions, boards, and agencies. The
following Section explores that evolution in greater depth.
ii. evolutions
The narrative of petitioning in this Article draws its arc from the volume of
congressional petitioning over time. In the ﬁrst decade after the Founding, the
petition volume in Congress grew as the population grew. However, at the end
of the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century, the petition volume stabilized and then began to decline. Finally, the volume of petitions in Congress dropped dramatically in the late 1940s to levels lower than at the Founding,
adjusted for population. One hypothesis to explain this reduction in volume is
that Congress had steadily constructed separate boards, agencies, commissions,
and courts to process these petitions and had siphoned off many petitions to
Congress to these other fora.
To better explore this hypothesis, as well as some of the other dynamics of
the congressional petition process and its institutional development, we constructed a topic model in the Database to sort petitions into topics. Congress
largely constructed alternative fora for petitions based on substantive expertise.
By tracking petitions according to topic, the topic model documents the siphoning of topics into these specialized fora. In particular, examining topics that had
the highest volume of petitioning illustrates the larger siphoning-off process that
rendered the congressional petition process largely vestigial by the late 1940s. To
this end, I selected three of the highest volume topic areas of petitions—claims,
pensions, and commerce—and crafted case studies speciﬁc to each. The case
study of each high-volume topic area documents the siphoning of petition volume away from Congress and into the specialized boards, commission, agencies,
and courts that now constitute the modern state.

the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that purpose,
shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the Congress by the agencies in the
executive branch of Government.” Id. § 136, 60 Stat. at 832.
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Each of the case studies shares a common narrative arc. The siphoning process for claims, pensions, and commerce all originated within the committee system in Congress. Congress often began by constructing infrastructure within
Congress to resolve petitions. But it quickly turned to the courts and executive
offices and agents to build out the infrastructure of the petition process. Finally,
Congress turned to such innovative institutional forms as independent commissions, boards, agencies, and specialized courts.
Moreover, each of the case studies offers a view on the petition process and
the development of the modern state. For example, both claims and pensions
required additional infrastructure to resolve a growing workload. But pensions
required the assistance of the executive, speciﬁcally the Department of War.
Claims petitions were seen as more adjudicative, in that they required more due
process and the proliferation of general principles to resolve uniformly. Congress
therefore quickly transitioned from operating through an adjudicative board to
creating a new form of court. Finally, commerce petitions presented a distinctive
case; there, petitions drove the creation of regulatory programs. Through an iterative process, Congress built commercial infrastructure in response to petitions and then responded to petitions in regulating how that commercial infrastructure would be used. Congress constructed the commerce petition process
to facilitate specialization and public engagement around the types of commercial infrastructure and the markets that relied on that infrastructure. These three
case studies also document some of the earliest standing committees—Claims,
Pensions, and Commerce—established by Congress, and provide a view of the
early institutional development of the Founding Era.
Collectively, these case studies provide an extended longitudinal view of the
petition process through dramatic shifts in parties, wars, technological revolution, and population growth from under 4 million to over 142 million. The Committee on Claims existed in various forms for over 150 years in the House until
the LRA abolished it in 1946.154 The 133-year-old Committee on Pensions remained in operation until the LRA fundamentally restructured it in 1946 and
charged the renamed “Committee on Veterans’ Affairs” with mere oversight of
pension processing elsewhere.155 And the Committee on Commerce survived the
LRA largely unscathed and has remained in continuous operation in the House,
under various names, for over 200 years.156 Together, these case studies document the siphoning of petition volume from the congressional petition process

154.

GUIDE TO THE RECORDS OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AT THE NATIONAL
ARCHIVES, 1789-1989: BICENTENNIAL EDITION ch. 6 (Charles E. Schamel et al. eds., 1995)
[hereinafter HOUSE RECORDS GUIDE].
155. Id. ch. 20.
156. Id. ch. 7.
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and into the modern state—revealing the roots of the modern state in the petition process and the rise and fall of congressional petitioning.
A. Siphoning Off Adjudication: The Court of Claims
As the second oldest standing committee in the House, the Committee on
Claims has witnessed the inner workings of Congress for over two hundred
years. Over the course of those two hundred years, pressed by concerns about
capacity and expertise, Congress built out the petition infrastructure for claims
processing by creating independent commissions and specialized courts. Petitions for claims spanned a broader range of grievances than our claims process
encompasses today. Grievances included not only claims of government misconduct but also refund requests; requests for waiver of rules of general applicability; and relief for harm caused by natural disasters, wars, and other misfortunes.
Michele Dauber reminds us that this expansive disaster relief system held the
origins of our modern welfare state.157 The claims petition system began with
the resolution of individual petitions through private bills, but Congress quickly
turned to the use of general legislation to resolve petitions for classes of claimants.158 Dauber notes that “[b]y 1827 Congress had already granted more than
two dozen claims for relief, encompassing thousands of claimants and millions
of dollars, following events such as the Whiskey Rebellion; the slave insurrection in St. Domingo (Haiti); and various ﬁres, ﬂoods, and storms.”159
Despite the use of general legislation to resolve petitions en masse, the expansive claims system soon began to strain under the volume of claims petitions.
In the First Congress, the House of Representatives adopted its petition procedures for settling claims against the federal government from the Confederation
Congress, but the volume of claims following the Revolutionary War exceeded
the capabilities of the newly formed institution.160 To address this growing volume, in 1794 the House established a mixed legislative and executive claims petition process, including the Committee on Claims and a process within the

157.

DAUBER, supra note 20, at 17-34.
Id. at 18.
159. Id. at 5.
160. HOUSE RECORDS GUIDE, supra note 154, paras. 6.15-6.32; 7 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 MARCH 1789-3 MARCH 1791,
at xvii-xviii (Kenneth R. Bowling et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL.
7]; DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 8, supra note 84, at xi.
158.
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Treasury Department that resembled the Confederation Congress’s three-member commission termed the “Board of Treasury.” 161 Unlike the Confederation
Congress, however, the United States Congress began to direct all claims to the
Comptroller of the newly formed Treasury, which then issued a decision.162 If
the claimant was satisﬁed with the Comptroller’s decision, it became ﬁnal. 163
Congress maintained some control over the process through its appropriations
power—it could always decline to grant an appropriation for the award.164 Congress also provided the means of appeal; dissatisﬁed claimants could challenge
the Comptroller’s decision with a petition to Congress, which was most often
resolved by the Committee on Claims.165
The antebellum era saw a preservation and expansion of the mixed legislative
and executive claims process, and the Congressional Petitions Database reveals a
steady increase in claims petition introductions of over 700% from the Founding
until 1835. With this increase in volume came delays in consideration as well as
complete failures to respond. Only 40% of the claims petitions introduced to the
22nd through 24th Congresses (1831-1837) received any kind of process.166 Although the mixed legislative-executive claims petition process had not raised constitutional concern, violations of the petition right caused by undue delays were
seen as serious. Congress faced growing criticism over its mishandling of claims
petitions.
After leaving the presidency, John Quincy Adams became a House Representative and ﬁerce advocate on behalf of the right to petition.167 Adams began
to call for a court of claims as early as 1832.168 To Adams, protection of the right
to petition was paramount—even above and beyond preserving Congress’s traditional role as the primary institution for claims petitions. Even if processing

161.
162.
163.
164.

165.
166.
167.

168.

Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States: The Evolution from a
Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625, 634, 643-44 (1985).
Id. at 637-45.
Id. at 644-45.
Id. at 637; see also id. at 644 (“[D]uring this period two general but separate claims systems
were functioning—the congressional committee system and the Treasury Department system.”).
Id. at 637, 644-45.
William M. Wiecek, The Origin of the United States Court of Claims, 20 ADMIN. L. REV. 387, 392
(1968).
WILLIAM LEE MILLER, ARGUING ABOUT SLAVERY: JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND THE GREAT BATTLE IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 443-44 (1998) (defending the right to petition against
the “gag rules”).
Wiecek, supra note 166, at 392.
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claims petitions was traditionally legislative, Adams argued that claims petitions
required courts to secure due process.
There ought to be no private business before Congress. There is a great
defect in our institutions by the want of a Court of Exchequer or Chamber of Accounts. It is a judicial business, and legislative assemblies ought
to have nothing to do with it. One-half of the time of Congress is consumed by it, and there is no common rule of justice for any two of the
cases decided. A deliberative Assembly is the worst of all tribunals for the
administration of justice.169
The House Committee of Claims, charged in 1832 with examining the efficiency
of its claims process, shared Adams’s concerns that legislative resolution of
claims was simply not administrable and required a more streamlined process,
such as a commission empowered to issue judgments. As the committee stated
in its report:
Whoever has attended to the proceedings on private claims in our House,
must be sensible of the impracticability of doing justice in more than two
hundred cases by this course. Years will sometimes elapse before a claimant can obtain even the form of a discussion of his case in the House; and
then it may be under such circumstances of apathy and inattention, as
shall render the chance of obtaining justice very uncertain at best. A distinguished member has observed that the right of petitioning Congress
virtually had become the right of having petitions rejected.170
By 1848, over a decade later, faith in the claims processing system in Congress
had only declined. The House Committee on Claims described its own claims
process as “a system of unparalleled injustice, and wholly discreditable to any
civilized nation.”171 Congressmen began to call for a solution that would “relieve
the Speaker’s table from that accumulated and accumulating mass of private
business under which it has literally groaned for ﬁve-and-twenty years.”172

169.

8 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS: COMPRISING PORTIONS OF HIS DIARY FROM 1795 TO 1848,
at 480 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1876).
170. H.R. REP. NO. 22-386, at 19 (1831).
171. H.R. REP. NO. 30-498, at 2 (1948); see also WILSON COWEN ET AL., THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF CLAIMS, A HISTORY, PART II: ORIGIN-DEVELOPMENT-JURISDICTION, 1855-1978, at 9 (1978);
Wiecek, supra note 166, at 395.
172. Wiecek, supra note 166, at 395 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1852)).
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The solution came in 1855 in the form of the Court of Claims Act.173 The Act
had originated in the Senate as a bill to establish a general commission “for the
examination and adjustment of private claims.”174 Earlier claims commissions
had been given narrow jurisdiction over claims speciﬁc to a particular event,
most often war, and the predecessor of the Court of Claims Act aimed to repurpose an old solution for a new problem. An overworked Congress mustered
enough opposition to amend the three-member commission into a three-judge
court with jurisdiction over “all claims founded upon any law of Congress, or
upon any regulation of an executive department, or upon any contract, express
or implied, with the government of the United States.”175
The Act raised concerns over both feasibility and constitutionality.176 Both
chambers questioned particulars of the proposed solution—that is, would the
court be empowered to issue ﬁnal judgments and would Congress still be required to pass an appropriation to fund those judgments—and whether those
particulars accorded with the Constitution.177 As is often the case with controversial legislative proposals, Congress resolved the debate with ambiguity and
delay.178 The 1855 Court of Claims Act passed both houses without clear text determining whether the court would resolve claims with ﬁnality.179
Early efforts by the House to disallow ﬁnal judgments from the “experimental” Court of Claims by reviewing them in select committees, rather than
with a pro forma stamp of approval from the whole House, stymied the court.180
Members began to refer to the Court of Claims as an “excres[c]ence on the Government,” calling its judgments “a mere mockery on justice.”181 Abraham Lincoln
called for quick reform in his ﬁrst State of the Union in 1861.182
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. (quoting Act of Feb. 24, 1855, 10 Stat. 612 (1855)).
CONG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 70 (1855).
Ernst Freund, Private Claims Against the State, 8 POL. SCI. Q. 625, 632 (1893).
Wiecek, supra note 166, at 396-97.
Id. at 396.
Id. at 397.
Id.
Id.; Shimomura, supra note 161, at 652-53.
Wiecek, supra note 166, at 398.
Id. (quoting 7 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3252 (James D. Richardson ed., 18971911) (“It is important that some more convenient means should be provided, if possible, for
the adjustment of claims against the government, especially in view of their increased number
by reason of the war . . . . The investigation and adjudication of claims in their nature belong
to the judicial department; besides, it is apparent that the attention of Congress will be more
than usually engaged, for some time to come, with great national questions. It was intended,
by the organization of the Court of Claims, mainly to remove this branch of business from
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Congress attempted to respond to Lincoln’s call for reform, but it stalled over
whether the new bill should maintain the Court of Claims or refer claims to the
federal district courts, and whether the bill should waive sovereign immunity
explicitly.183 A conﬂicted Congress stalled reform for over two years until a ﬂood
of Civil War claims propelled the 1863 Court of Claims Act through both chambers and onto Lincoln’s desk.184 The ﬂood of Civil War claims did not, however,
wash away all of the constitutional concerns with the court.185 The Act purported
to provide for ﬁnality of the court’s judgments and appeal of the judgments to
the Supreme Court.186 But, at the same time, it preserved and reaffirmed a practice whereby the Secretary of the Treasury had to “estimate[] for” each claim
before it was paid and Congress had to appropriate the funds for each judgment.187 Constitutional concerns faded as the Court of Claims established itself
as an efficient means to process petitions for claims, and as Congress steadily
siphoned more claims petitions to the courts.
Over the eighty years that followed, Congress transferred the legislative-executive claims system into the courts through a progression similar to that of the
Court of Claims. Congress ﬁrst transferred expanded advisory jurisdiction over
portions of the petition process and requested reports in return, rather than ﬁnal
judgments.188 Expanded advisory jurisdiction eventually ripened into full jurisdiction, as Congress transferred full consideration of claims, either generally or

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

188.

the halls of Congress; but while the court has proved to be an effective and valuable means of
investigation, it in great degree fails to effect the object of its creation for want of power to
make its judgments ﬁnal.”); see also COWEN ET AL., supra note 171, at 21 (quoting Lincoln and
describing Congress’s reaction); Shimomura, supra note 161, at 655 (quoting Lincoln);
Wiecek, supra note 166, at 398-99 (quoting Lincoln and describing Congress’s attempt to follow his instructions).
Wiecek, supra note 166, at 399.
Id.
Shimomura, supra note 161, at 657-58.
Id. at 657.
Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 426 (1863)); see also Wiecek, supra note 166,
at 400 (describing the last-minute amendment requiring the Secretary to “estimate[]”
claims). Congress repealed this requirement in 1866 after Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2
Wall.) 561 (1864), called the Court of Claim’s status as an Article III court into question, in
part, because of the lack of ﬁnality of the Court’s judgments due to the provision. Wiecek,
supra note 166, at 401-02.
Shimomura, supra note 161, at 663-66. In 1883, Congress reached out to the courts for assistance with a growing claims petition docket with an “act to afford assistance and relief to
Congress and the executive departments in the investigation of claims and demands against
the government.” Bowman Act, ch. 116, 22 Stat. 485 (1883). The Bowman Act provided that
all claims petitions pending before any Senate or House committee or before the executive
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for speciﬁc classes of petitions. What had once been the work of Congress and
an independent commission had now become the work of the courts.189
The ﬁnal large transfer of claims petitions came in 1946 with the passage of
the LRA and, in particular, Title IV of the Act, separately titled the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA). The FTCA abolished the claims committees in Congress,
banned the issuance of private bills for covered claims, and delegated jurisdiction
over all claims petitions to the Court of Claims and the federal courts.190 Following this transfer, the number of claims petitions in Congress decreased to the low
volume of petitions seen today, dramatically lower even than the claims petition
volume at the Founding.
B. Siphoning Off the Provision of Public Beneﬁts: The Bureau of Pensions
The American pension system began with the Revolution, and it began with
petitions. Over the next 150 years, the pension petition system followed a similar
pattern to that of claims. It originated within the committee system in Congress
and then, in response to workload and expertise concerns, Congress began to
build out the pension petition process using the infrastructure of the federal
courts, independent commissions, and the executive.
The Continental Congress, faced with mounting petitions for relief in the
spring of 1776, passed the nascent government’s ﬁrst general pension legislation
offering “invalid pensions”—pensions to soldiers whose injuries during Revolutionary War service left them unable to earn a livelihood.191 These pensions were
ﬁrst paid for and administered by the separate states, which would report annually a roll of all pensioners to the Secretary of War.192
In 1789, the First Congress took responsibility for payments to all pensioners
listed on the state pension rolls with the intention of limiting pensions to only

189.

190.
191.
192.

requiring investigation or fact ﬁnding would be transferred to the Court of Claims for investigation and reporting. The court then issued a report back to Congress or the executive for
ﬁnal judgment. Id. at 485-86.
One of the most notable transfers came in 1887 in the form of the Tucker Act. Tucker Act, ch.
359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codiﬁed as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012)). To relieve Congress
of some of its growing claims petition volume, Congress expanded the jurisdiction of the
Court of Claims to encompass claims for violation of the Constitution, claims grounded in
government contracts, and claims for damages. The Tucker Act also leveraged the resources
of the growing federal judiciary by creating limited concurrent jurisdiction over these same
claims in the lower federal courts. Id.
Pub. L. No. 79-601, tit. IV, 60 Stat. 812, 842 (1946).
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 7, supra note 160, at 332.
Id.
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those listed. 193 But, in response to a number of petitions, the First Congress
quickly began to make exceptions.194 Upon receipt of these petitions, Congress
would refer them primarily to the Secretary of War for a report.195 Following
review of the Secretary’s report on a particular petition, Congress would draft
and pass a private bill to resolve the petitioner’s grievance.196 Any petition requiring the attention of Congress would be referred to the Committee on
Claims, which held jurisdiction over pension petitions until the creation of a separate standing pensions committee in 1813.197 Despite these exceptions, the class
of pensioners by early 1792 did not exceed 1,500 individuals.198
Faced with a steady stream of petitions for exceptions, the Second Congress
attempted to streamline the process and to draw on the resources of the judiciary
and the executive.199 The 1792 Pension Act invited new pension petitions by repealing the 1788 statute of limitations restricting the pension rolls, and establishing a hybrid judicial-executive process to resolve those new petitions.200 According to the 1792 Act, petitioners would submit their petitions not to
Congress, but to the federal district courts. These courts would conduct the
medical examination, review the petition, certify any requisite affidavits, and recommend a pension amount. The Act then directed the district courts to submit
the examination, certiﬁed documents, and recommendation to the Secretary of
War, who would ultimately decide whether to grant the petitioner a pension.
Some members of the federal courts rebelled against the 1792 Act.201 Five of
the then six sitting justices of the Supreme Court, who also served on the lower
courts pursuant to the 1789 Judiciary Act, sent letters to President George Washington, declining their new appointments as “commissioners” under the 1792
Act.202 United States Attorney General Edmond Randolph quickly petitioned for
a writ of mandamus on behalf of pension petitioner William Hayburn to force

193.

Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 24, 1 Stat. 95.
See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., PETITIONS, MEMORIALS, AND
OTHER DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF CONGRESS, MARCH 7, 1789 TO
DECEMBER 14, 1795, at 5 (Comm. Print 1986).
195. Id. at 5-9, 11.
196. Id. at 5-9.
197. HOUSE RECORDS GUIDE, supra note 154, ch. 6.
198. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 7, supra note 160, at 334.
199. Id.
200. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792).
201. Id. at 408.
202. Id. at 408 n.*.
194.
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the courts to comply with the Act.203 Hayburn’s writ never resulted in a decision
on the merits, as the Supreme Court continued the case to buy time and put
pressure on Congress to amend the Act.204 The Court, in its order continuing
the case, foreshadowed its constitutional concerns.205 In particular, the Court expressed deep concerns over the separation of powers issues raised by granting
the Secretary of War the ability to override the district court’s recommendation
to issue a pension.206 “Such revision and control,” the Court noted, was “radically
inconsistent with the independence of that judicial power which is vested in the
courts; and, consequently, with that important principle which is so strictly observed by the constitution of the United States.”207 Moreover, it was clear, the
Court noted, that Congress could also easily override any decision by either the
Secretary or the courts, and that the Secretary did not hold the life tenure of a
judge and was therefore subject to the caprice of Congress in his decision making.208
Legal scholars have deemed Hayburn’s Case an important early expression of
the Supreme Court’s position on separation of powers, justiciability, and even
judicial review of legislative action.209 But it remains equally important for its
acceptance of the assignment of the petition process to the courts. In the remonstrances submitted to the Congress by the circuit courts, appended to the order,210 the courts did not question the 1792 Act’s requirement that the district
courts assist in investigation and fact-ﬁnding. The remonstrances also did not
raise concerns regarding the Secretary of War’s role—even though the pension
process previously had been well accepted as within the province of the legislature. The fact that the courts continued to assist Congress with the petition process affirmed that omission of these concerns was likely intentional.

203.

Id. at 408.
Id. at 408-10; see also William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 455, 536 (2005) (“[T]he Court decided to delay to see if Congress would respond to the
constitutional concerns that had been raised and repeal the Invalid Pensions Act.”).
205. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 408 n.*.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach,
81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 438-41 (1996).
210. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 408 n.*; 6 The DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, CASES: 1790-1795, at 33 n.4 (Maeva Marcus et al.
eds., 1998).
204.
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Before the Supreme Court could act on Hayburn’s Case, Congress acquiesced
and passed an amendment to the Act in 1793.211 Pursuant to the amendment, the
district courts would continue to examine petitions and certify affidavits and
documentation, but would no longer make a recommendation on whether to
grant the pension. To avoid lodging all discretion with the Secretary of War, the
amendment required the Secretary of War to report all pensions granted to the
Committee on Claims for ﬁnal consideration.212
The standing Committee on Claims continued to handle ﬁnal approvals on
pension petitions for the next ﬁfty years. But in 1813, a Congress overwhelmed
by the War of 1812 created the ﬁrst standing Committee on Pensions and Revolutionary War Claims. However, the ﬂood of pension petitions only grew in the
antebellum era. The number of pensioners in 1816 was 2,200, only a few hundred
more than the 1,500 pensioners on rolls during the First Congress. But just four
years later, that ﬁgure had risen to 17,730. That increase was no doubt due, in
part, to Congress’s expansion of military pensions in 1818 to all Revolutionary
War veterans living in poverty, regardless of disability. Advocates of the 1818
Pension Act anticipated 2,000 new pension petitions. Instead, following passage
of the Act, the Pension Bureau was overwhelmed with 20,000 petitions for new
pensions. Pension petitions to the Committee on Pensions and Revolutionary
War Claims increased by nine times between the 15th and 19th Congresses213
until yet another war tested the capacity of the Committee.214
211.

Invalid Pensions Act of 1793, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 324; see also Maeva Marcus, Is the Supreme Court a
Political Institution?, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 95, 104 & n.38 (2003) (describing the political
context of the continuance and subsequent mooting of Hayburn’s Case).
212. See Invalid Pensions Act §§ 1-2, 1 Stat. at 324-25. What Congress considered ﬁnal consideration shifted over the years as Congress asserted more or less control over the process. To illustrate Congress’s mercurial approach to oversight: For about seven years, from 1796 until 1803,
Congress began to pass private bills to grant new petitions for new pensions. See WILLIAM H.
GLASSON, FEDERAL MILITARY PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 61-62 (1918). Then in 1803,
Congress authorized the Secretary of War to add petitioners to the pension rolls in the absence
of a private bill. Id. at 62. This phase lasted for another few years, until Congress reclaimed
the pension process for itself and again began to pass private bills to resolve petitioners’ pension grievances. Id. at 63.
213. The ﬁgures here are drawn from the Congressional Petitions Database.
214. Over time, Congress would attempt to handle the increase in petition workload by creating
more and more specialized committees to resolve petitions for particular pensions. In 1825,
handling both pension petitions and revolutionary claims petitions became unmanageable
and Congress split the pension committee in two. HOUSE RECORDS GUIDE, supra note 154,
para. 6.34. The Committee on Revolutionary Claims continued to receive and process petitions for claims. Id. para. 6.73. But the Committee on Military Pensions became the sole committee for pension petitions until Congress split the committee again a few years later. Id.
para. 6.40. Congress’s liberalization of pensions would only continue, as Congress expanded
pension eligibility for veterans of all wars—including the Indian Wars, the Mexican-American
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As Theda Skocpol has rigorously documented, the Civil War took hold of
the antebellum era pension system and shook it to its core.215 In 1862, before the
enrollment of Civil War pensioners, the pension rolls totaled 10,700 pensioners
at an expenditure of approximately $1 million per year.216 A mere four years later,
in 1866, the pension rolls had grown to over 126,722 pensioners at an expenditure of approximately $15.5 million per year.217 The Pension Bureau of the antebellum era employed 72 staff members, but that number had multiplied to 1,500
members by the mid-1880s.218 By 1891 the Pension Bureau, now a part of the
Department of the Interior, employed over 2,000 staff members with a support
staff of 419.219 But the sheer volume of pension petitions submitted to the Pension Bureau began to overwhelm even the infrastructure of what some considered “the largest executive bureau in the world.”220 The backlog measured several
hundred thousand claims and stalled the pension system into the 1890s.221
As was the case in the early nineteenth century, the congressional petition
process served as a pressure valve for the Pension Bureau and allowed aggrieved
individuals to petition Congress for redress. However, unlike the Pension Bureau, which had expanded its staff and resources, Congress remained essentially
the same institution, dependent upon its members without much staff support.
Representative Robert M. La Follette, father of Robert M. La Follette Jr., who
was one of the architects of the LRA, recalled that he spent 25-33% of his time in
the House addressing pension petitions.222 La Follette was not the only member

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

War, and others—in 1832, and to their widows in 1836. Theda Skocpol, America’s First Social
Security System: The Expansion of Beneﬁts for Civil War Veterans, 108 POL. SCI. Q. 85, 92 (1993);
see also Kristin A. Collins, “Petitions Without Number”: Widows’ Petitions and the Early Nineteenth-Century Origins of Marriage-Based Entitlements, 31 L. & HIST. REV. 8 (2013). To distribute workload over the new pensioners, Congress again split the Committee on Military Pensions in two during the 22nd Congress (1831-1833). HOUSE RECORDS GUIDE, supra note 154,
para. 6.40. The Committee on Revolutionary Pensions would serve as a generalist committee
for pensions granted based on service or need, while the Committee on Invalid Pensions
would focus on disability pensions. Id. paras. 6.46, 6.59.
SKOCPOL, supra note 18, at 102-51.
Id. at 107-08.
Id. at 108.
MASHAW, supra note 17, at 263.
THEDA SKOCPOL, SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: FUTURE POSSIBILITIES IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 60 (1995).
Id. (quoting Green B. Raum, Pensions and Patriotism, 153 NORTH AM. REV. 205, 211 (1891));
accord SKOCPOL, supra note 18, at 121.
SKOCPOL, supra note 18, at 121.
Id.
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to expend a considerable amount of energy on pension petitions.223 Despite the
best efforts of these members, the process afforded to petitions in Congress necessarily became increasingly informal.
Pension petitioners began to raise their grievances through letters to their
representatives, rather than submitting formal complaint-like petitions. Interactions between Congress and the Pension Bureau, although voluminous, were not
conducted according to any formalized process at that time.224 During the period
that La Follette was in office, the
volume of correspondence between the Pension Bureau and members of
Congress was immense. In 1880 it was reported as amounting to nearly
40,000 written and personal inquiries; in 1888 it had more than doubled
(94,000 items); and by 1891 it reached a peak of 154,817 congressional
calls for information on cases, an average of over 500 for each working
day.225
Even after shifting much of the pension process to the Pension Bureau, members
of Congress still retained the ability to circumvent the agency entirely and resolve
pensioners’ petitions with the passage of private bills. Through private bills,
Congress could add pensioners directly to the rolls, increase the rate of a petitioner’s pension, or correct a soldier’s military record to remove barriers to pension qualiﬁcation, such as a desertion or dishonorable discharge.226 But private
pension bills began to skyrocket under the informal petition “appeals” process of
the late nineteenth century.

223.

Id. (discussing Representative Roswell G. Horr).
224. Id. at 122.
225. Id. (quoting LEONARD D. WHITE, THE REPUBLICAN ERA: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY: 1869-1901, at 75 (1958)).
226. Id. at 122-23.
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FIGURE 6.
PRIVATE BILLS BY CONGRESS
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Passage of private pension bills peaked in Congress during the 1880s and
again in the 59th Congress (1909-1911) with a record high of 9,649. “In the 49th
Congress [1885–1887], 40 percent of the legislation in the House and 55 percent
in the Senate consisted of special pension acts. It was customary for Friday evening to be ‘pension night’ during congressional sessions.”227
Earlier Congresses referred pension petitions to the Pension Committees of
each chamber and required a comprehensive reporting and review process. But
the Pension Committees of the late nineteenth century, overwhelmed by the volume of pension petitions, relaxed the formal petition process even further.228
The Pension Committees began dividing the pension petitions equally among
all of the membership of each chamber for review.229 The sheer volume of petitions often precluded review in any real depth, however, and many members
simply handed their allocation over to their secretaries and congressional

227.

SKOCPOL, supra note 219, at 63 (alteration in original) (quoting MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF
STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 311 (1977)).
228. GLASSON, supra note 212, at 275-77.
229. Id.
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clerks.230 Congress would then pass private pension bills with little to no formal
process.231
A review of the Congressional Petitions Database reveals a fairly steady decline in pension petitions introduced into Congress in the twentieth century.
This reduction, however, witnessed little corresponding decrease in the number
of pensions actually processed.232 Years of frantic attempts to increase efficiency
had ﬁnally transformed the petition process completely, taking with it many of
the formalities and procedural protections afforded to each claimant. Descriptions of the petition process during the 1920s capture a fully routinized system
of pension processing wholly distinct from the petition process that preceded it.
Petitions were no longer read on the ﬂoor, made part of the formal record, and
processed individually.233 Rather, the ﬁrst day of the 70th Congress (1927-1929)
“broke an all time record for the number of bills referred to a committee in a
single day” when 3,775 draft private bills were introduced to the House Committee on Pensions.234 The Committee then bundled these private bills into a single
omnibus bill which again broke records as “the largest bill ever printed during
any Congress.”235 It was this routinized system at which the LRA took aim. The
Act explicitly banned the private bills used to resolve pensions, transferred jurisdiction over those pensions ﬁrmly to the Veterans Administration, and abolished
the Committee on Pensions.236 The Act had its intended effect—the number of
private pension bills slowed to the low volumes that we see today.
The staggering rise and gradual decline of the petition process for pensions
reveals several dynamics important for understanding the development of the
modern administrative state. Ultimately, it shows how a process that allowed for
formal interaction with Congress did not break down for fear of comingling of
legislative and adjudicatory powers; nor did the process break down over concerns that Congress created an innovative agency, board, or commission. Instead, the petition process broke down with respect to pensions because Congress refused to construct an agency, board, or commission with full jurisdiction
to process petitions. As the workload of Congress increased with a growth in

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id.
Id.
HOUSE RECORDS GUIDE, supra note 154.
Id.
Id. para. 6.56.
Id.
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 131, 60 Stat. 812, 831 (banning
private bills); id. § 121(a), 60 Stat. at 829 (establishing the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs);
see also HOUSE RECORDS GUIDE, supra note 154, para. 6.65.
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population and a series of wars, Congress nevertheless attempted to retain pension petition processing internally. Until it was abolished, the petition process
for pensions was replete with interactions between constituents and Congress
that did not involve the vote or the initiative process.
C. Siphoning Off Regulation: The Interstate Commerce Commission
Like claims and pensions, commerce petitions also originated from the committee system in Congress. Congress transferred the commerce petition process
into commissions, boards, and agencies that could develop specialized expertise.
But commerce petitions differed in many ways from those making claims seeking pensions. The volume of petitions did not drive the creation of further petition infrastructure; rather, the petitions’ substance led to the construction of commercial infrastructure and mediated the use of that infrastructure. Petitions
served as a mechanism by which the public could shape the development of the
economy and have voice as to how Congress would regulate that economy.
The House established the standing Committee on Commerce and Manufactures in the ﬁrst session of the Fourth Congress (1795-1797) in order to “take
into consideration all such petitions and matters or things touching the commerce [and manufactures] of the United States . . . .”237 Petitions later referred
to the newly established Committee on Commerce had earlier been resolved with
a referral to the Secretary of Treasury or to a select committee in the House.238 A
review of the Database—speciﬁcally, petition introductions during the antebellum era that were referred to the Committee on Commerce and Manufactures—
reveals petitions addressing a range of topics. However, petitions mostly focused
on the regulation of commerce directly through the imposition of duties, tariffs,
excises, embargoes, and indirectly by subsidizing and building the infrastructure
of waterborne commerce.
Commerce petitions provide examples of the complex ends to which petitioners exercised the process—both to promote general legislation regulating
commerce and then to request speciﬁc exceptions and amendments to that gen-

237.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WITH THE AMENDMENTS THERETO: TO
WHICH ARE ADDED JEFFERSON’S MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE, THE STANDING RULES
AND ORDERS FOR CONDUCTING BUSINESS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE OF
THE UNITED STATES, AND BARCLAY’S DIGEST 183 (1871) (documenting the relevant rule of the
House adopted on Dec. 14, 1795).
238. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., PETITIONS, MEMORIALS, AND
OTHER DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF CONGRESS, MARCH 7, 1789 TO
DECEMBER 14, 1795, at 6 (Comm. Print 1986).
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eral legislation. Early petitioners to the House, usually in the form of trade associations organized by city, petitioned for the passage of general legislation promoting American manufacture and trade through the imposition of duties and
tariffs on imports.239 Congress responded with the passage of general duty and
tariff legislation, known as the Impost Act, which went into effect in August
1789.240 As early as December of that year, Congress began to receive petitions
requesting exemptions from and amendments to the general revenue legislation.
President Ezra Stiles of Yale College submitted the ﬁrst petition for an exemption, praying for a refund of import duties paid on a “philosophical Apparatus”—
in modern parlance, basic lab equipment like air pumps and microscopes—recently purchased from London for use at the college.241 Alexander Hamilton,
then Secretary of Treasury, issued a report on Stiles’s petition, ﬁnding that another recent act had exempted philosophical apparatus from import duties in the
future. On those grounds, he recommended an equitable restitution of Stiles’s
duties paid.242 Congress created a speciﬁc exemption for Yale College243 and, as
was often the case, deferred to the report’s recommendation to continue the exemption in future iterations of the statute.244
Beyond legislation regulating commerce through tariffs and the like, Congress’s early regulation of commerce involved a complex relationship between
subsidy of commercial infrastructure and licensing to regulate the use of that
infrastructure. Petitions drove the subsidy process by identifying areas for development, and commercial agents then had to petition for licenses to take advantage of the subsidy. A review of petition introductions in the Congressional
Petitions Database reveals that, during the antebellum era, Congress primarily
subsidized infrastructure for waterborne trade. These petitions provided the primary mechanism by which Congress identiﬁed the need for improvements, as
cities, localities, and occasionally associations of individuals and merchants petitioned Congress for improvements in their areas. Petitions included requests for

239.
240.

241.
242.
243.
244.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 8, supra note 84, at 360-62.
Act of July 4, 1789, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24; see DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 8, supra note 84, at 36263. Also in 1789, the same year that Congress passed general tariff legislation, Congress instituted a licensing scheme “for Registering and Clearing Vessels, Regulating the Coasting
Trade, and for other purposes.” 1 Stat. 55 (1789). The scheme’s primary aim was to facilitate
the collection of duties and tariffs by requiring licensed ships to petition duty collectors for a
license at each port and by requiring disclosure of all cargo subject to duties and delivery of
the ship to collectors for inspection. Id.
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 8, supra note 84, at 363-64.
Id. at 364.
Id. at 362-63 (“[T]he Ways and Means Act [HR-83] had speciﬁcally exempted from duties
‘Philosophical apparatus specially imported for any seminary of learning.’”).
Id.
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construction of navigation aids, like lighthouses, fog signals, and beacons; the
designation of ports of entry to administer duties and tariffs; and improvement
of the nation’s waterways with channels, bridges, and ports.
In the ﬁrst thirty years of the Republic, Congress focused its subsidies on
coastal commerce, but before long the allure of steam power drew those subsidies inland. A review of petitions from the 1820s in the Congressional Petitions
Database reveals petitions for coastal lighthouses and ports that began to commingle with petitions for inland waterway improvements for steamboats. Such
petitions included requests to improve the navigability of Lake Erie, as well as
the Connecticut, Hudson, and Ohio Rivers, among others. Given the ability of
steamboats to traverse inland waterways at never-before-seen speeds, petitions
also prayed for lakeside harbors, river lighthouses and bells, and the construction
of canals to connect lakes and rivers. Not surprisingly, a review of the Congressional Petitions Database reveals that many of these petitions derived from coalitions of steamboat owners and merchants, while residents of cities and states
submitted the rest.
Congress then began to regulate who could use its subsidized commercial
infrastructure by requiring petitions for licenses.245 In effect, the subsidized infrastructure served as a vehicle for Congress to regulate areas of commerce previously entirely under the province of the states.246 For example, in response to
petitions, the federal government began to open domestic waterways like the
Hudson River to steamboat commerce, and then Congress required steamboat
operators to petition for a license to use those domestic waterways.247
As ships carrying federal licenses made their way into the interior of the
United States, jurisdictional disputes arose between federal and state licensing
schemes. These disputes evolved into the foundational efforts to clarify congressional jurisdiction over the regulation of commerce. Former steamboat partners,
Aaron Ogden and Thomas Gibbons, found themselves engaged in such a dispute
following the bitter dissolution of their partnership in 1818.248 After their partnership dissolved, Ogden sued Gibbons in New York court to enforce his rights
under the New York license they had previously shared. Gibbons countered that
he had been granted a federal license to operate a ship, under a later version of
the 1789 federal licensing scheme, which preempted Ogden’s monopoly.249 The

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Mashaw, Administration and “the Democracy,” supra note 24, at 1631.
Id. at 1629.
See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Id.
Id.
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New York Court of Errors sided with Ogden, and Gibbons appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.250
In 1824, Chief Justice John Marshall authored the Court’s opinion in Gibbons
v. Ogden, reversing the Court of Errors and clarifying that Congress’s past regulation of navigation—through licensing and infrastructure subsidy—fell within
the scope of the term “commerce” in the Commerce Clause.251 To the question
of whether the enumerated power to regulate “commerce” should encompass
regulation of navigation, the Court looked to past practice.252 The power to regulate navigation, as an aspect of commerce, had been “exercised from the commencement of the government, has been exercised with the consent of all, and
has been understood by all to be a commercial regulation.”253 Because Congress
had the power to regulate navigation and because the 1793 licensing scheme was
a proper exercise of this power, the Supreme Court held that the state license
must give way under the preemptive power of the Supremacy Clause.254
Congress soon began to require petitions for licenses not only to regulate
who could use its subsidized infrastructure but also to regulate how this infrastructure would be used. In response to an increasing number of petitions praying for resolution of safety concerns around subsidized infrastructure, Congress
aimed its licensing requirements at safety concerns. To use steamboats again as
an illustration, despite Congress’s best efforts at ensuring the safety of the new
steam powered waterways, this new form of transportation still presented a signiﬁcant hazard. Many quite gruesome boiler explosions aboard steamships,
some carrying hundreds of passengers, raised public concern over steamboat
safety.255 Petitions began to pray in the 1830s for national regulation of boilers.
In 1838, following an extensive report by the Treasury recommending regulation,
a call for regulation by President Andrew Jackson in his 1832 State of the Union

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

255.

Id.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 81-82. It bears noting that the difference between the United States Supreme Court and
the New York Court of Errors did not lie in the interpretation of the term “commerce.” See
Gibbons v. Ogden, 17 Johns. 488, 509-10 (1820). The latter court made clear in its opinion
that, had Congress issued a monopoly license in conﬂict with New York’s license, the state
license would have given way. Id. The outcome turned on the difference in interpretation of
the reach of the 1793 licensing act, Act of Feb. 18, 1793, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 305. Id. Both courts took
for granted that “commerce” would of course include regulation of navigation.
Robert Gudmestad, The Horriﬁc Accident that Created the Regulatory State, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 31, 2013, 11:40 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2013-01-31/the-horriﬁc
-accident-that-created-the-regulatory-state [http://perma.cc/4AB6-BKAJ].
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Address to Congress, 256 and three horriﬁc boiler explosions, Congress ﬁnally
acted with the passage of the Steamboat Act of 1838.257
Some have heralded the Act as the beginning of comprehensive regulation of
commerce, but contemporaries quickly came to view it as ineffective because it
lacked an enforcement mechanism.258 In 1852, Congress amended the Steamboat
Act, replacing “the three-page, thirteen-section statute that it had passed in 1838
[with a] bill contain[ing] forty-three sections and r[unning] fourteen pages in
the statutes at large.”259 Most importantly, the 1852 Amendment created a Board
of Supervising Inspectors to not only regulate steamboat safety, but also facilitate
public engagement in that regulation through the petition process.260 This ninemember commission met annually to set rules and regulations for the inspectors
of steamboats and for the steamboat pilots and masters.261 Although seemingly
regulatory in nature, Board procedure often blurred the lines between regulation
and adjudication.262 The Board “often described its rules as responding to petitions or complaints from outside parties.” 263 By 1858, the Board formally set
aside “time at its annual meeting to hear orally from petitioners.”264 Early Board
meetings resembled congressional petition procedure as the Board received petitions and responded to them through ad hoc committees or through deliberation of the whole Board.265
The regulation of steam-powered rail followed a similar path to that of
steam-powered boats. It began with the development of infrastructure through
the congressional petition process, and moved into the construction by statute
of a commission to regulate and process petitions as to how that infrastructure
would be used. A review of the Congressional Petitions Database revealed a

256.

Andrew Jackson, President of the U.S., Fourth Annual Message (Dec. 4,
1832), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29474 [http://perma.cc/MYC4
-FELS].
257. Act of July 7, 1838, ch. 191, 5 Stat. 304.
258. See MASHAW, supra note 17, at 187-208.
259. Id. at 192.
260. Act of Aug. 30, 1852, ch. 98, 10 Stat. 38.; see also MASHAW, supra note 17, at 192.
261. MASHAW, supra note 17, at 193-94.
262. Id. at 196-200.
263. Id. at 203.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 202.
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steady increase in petitions for rail infrastructure between the 1820s and 1830s.266
Petitioners prayed for exemptions from duties on iron imports, the construction
of railways by the federal government, grants of timberland to supply timber,
and for subscriptions of railroad stock. But most often, petitioners prayed for
land. The steady westward expansion of the United States and the displacement
of native peoples through aggressive removal policies had increased the public
landholdings of the federal government.267 Rail companies turned to Congress
with petition and hat in hand, and the length of United States railroad track began to grow.268
Much like the regulation of steamboats in exchange for licenses, Congress
began its regulation of rails with an investigation and reporting scheme contingent on the receipt of federal subsidy. By 1878, when Congress established the
Office of the Auditor of Railroad Accounts within the Department of the Interior,
most railroads fell squarely within the Act’s jurisdiction.269 The 1878 Act gave the
Auditor of Railroad Accounts the power to investigate the railroads and report
to the Secretary of the Interior, while the railroads were required to make their
books available and provide all prescribed reports.270 Mashaw has noted the similarities between the investigatory and reporting power of this precursor to the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, and the powers of the Interstate Commerce
Commission established by the Act.271 Like the 1838 Steamboat Act,272 the 1878
Act lacked an enforcement mechanism and was soon decried as insufficient.273
Nine years later, Congress established the Interstate Commerce Commission, created by the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 to regulate the railroads
and to facilitate public engagement in that regulation.274 The Interstate Commerce Commission is often described as the ﬁrst independent administrative
266.

Although the Database recognizes particular petition topics, it is not yet reﬁned sufficiently
and the “prayer” ﬁeld not yet cleaned sufficiently to allow automatic coding of subtopics. Instead, I reviewed the petitions from this period by hand for both number and substance.
267. RICHARD WHITE, RAILROADED 24-25 (2012).
268. Id. at 130-31.
269. Mashaw, Law and the Gilded Age, supra note 24, at 1398.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1398 n.113.
272. MASHAW, supra note 17, at 190, 195.
273. See id. at 244; Act of June 19, 1878, ch. 316, § 5, 20 Stat. 169, 170 (providing that ﬁnes under
the Act could only be levied upon referral to the Attorney General).
274. Id. at 1365 n.1 (quoting LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 439 (2d ed.
1985) (“In hindsight, the development of administrative law seems mostly a contribution of
the 20th century . . . . The creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission, in 1887, has been
taken to be a kind of genesis.”)).
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agency, and its creation is often pointed to as the birth of the American administrative state.275 However, as this Section illustrates, the structure of the Commission was not necessarily innovative. Rather, it resembled closely the structure
of commissions established by earlier Congresses and especially the Board of Supervising Inspectors established by the Steamboat Act of 1852.276 Like the Steamboat Act of 1852,277 the Interstate Commerce Act established a multi-member
commission to oversee inspection of the railroads and enforcement of the Act.278
Enforcement of the Act also relied, in part, on a petition process.279 Speciﬁcally,
the Act allowed individuals and organizations to petition the Commission to address particular charges of violations of the Act or to clarify the Act.280 In 1888,
the year following the Act, the Congressional Petitions Database revealed that
petition introductions to regulate equitable rates dropped nearly to zero.
The last few years of the nineteenth century and the ﬁrst few decades of the
twentieth century were characterized by a general decline in petition volume in
the generalist Interstate Commerce Committee, as most of the commerce petitions were better served by specialized commissions. 281 The Interstate Commerce Committee was one of eighteen committees that survived the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act’s reduction of House standing committees from 48 to
19.282 However, petition volume in the Committee only continued to decline.
iii. the participatory state
The original meaning of the term “democracy,” coined in the political theory of
ancient Greece, was: government by the people (demos = people, kcratein =
govern). The essence of the political phenomenon designated by the term was
the participation of the governed in the government, the principle of freedom in
275.

Id.
276. Act of Aug. 30, 1852, ch. 106, 10 Stat. 61.
277. Id.
278. An Act to Regulate Commerce (Interstate Commerce Act), ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, 386 (1887).
279. Id. at § 13; Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and “the Democracy,” supra note 24.
280. Id.
281. Although the general trend is decline, this period in the Congressional Petitions Database saw
heavy variation in petition volume due to high volume petition campaigns on matters of public interest. For example, the 55th Congress experienced a surge in petitions regarding the
regulation of the interstate shipping of cigarettes, interstate shipping of gambling materials,
and an anti-scalping bill for railroad tickets.
282. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 121(a), 60 Stat. 812, 826; David
C. King, The Nature of Congressional Committee Jurisdictions, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 48, 55
(1994).
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the sense of political self-determination; and this was the meaning with which
the term has been taken over by the political theory of Western civilization. –
Hans Kelsen, Foundations of Democracy (1955)283
Out of the petition process, Congress has constructed what I designate the
“participatory state.”284 Because of shortcomings in the models on which much
of our public law theory is grounded, public law scholarship has often neglected
the existence and function of the participatory facets of our government. Excavation of the petition process, however, reveals the architecture of the participatory state more clearly.
This Part draws out the lessons of the history of petitioning for our understanding of the participatory state. Section III.A grounds the historical narrative
in emerging and established theories on governance and participation—the work
of Heather Gerken and Hans Kelsen, respectively. Section III.B then takes these
lessons and offers friendly amendments to legal process theory.
A. Naming the Participatory State
As Part I described, from the Founding onward, Congress responded to individual petitions through a formal, public, and equal process that resembles litigation more closely than politics. Congress constructed by statute boards and
commissions that were not clearly within one single branch of government, and
it made law not in isolation, but in consultation with individuals and minorities
affected by those laws. Many aspects of our government that seem of ambiguous
constitutional status—the Court of Claims, public beneﬁt programs, and such—
have their roots in the petition process in Congress, and were born of Congress’s
efforts to satisfy its obligations under the Petition Clause. The making of speciﬁc
laws, public or private, thus involved a process closer to adjudication. Congress
passed laws of general application in response to petition campaigns. Even once
legislation was passed, the lawmaking process reﬂected an understanding that

283.
284.

Hans Kelsen, Foundations of Democracy, 66 ETHICS 1, 3 (1955).
The participatory state responds also to Jody Freeman’s call for a new administrative law
agenda that reﬂects upon “how governance depends heavily on private participation.” Jody
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 673 (2000). In modern
administrative governance, Freeman documents “a deep interdependence among public and
private actors in accomplishing the business of governance.” Id. at 547. According to Freeman,
it is this interdependence that animates the legitimacy crisis in administrative law and Freeman roots a new concept of administration, that of a “set of negotiated relationships,” in order
to recognize this interdependence and resolve the legitimacy crisis. Id. at 548. In essence, Freeman proposed nearly twenty years ago a form of the participatory state and a similar move
away from a strictly Weberian view of administration.
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laws of general applicability could affect various populations differently and,
thus, Congress created exceptions and amendments in response to petitions.285
The historical petition process problematizes the belief that our modern notion of strict separation of powers had any real place in early American lawmaking. Engagement with the public through the petition process took many forms,
not all of them clearly delineated as adjudicative, legislative, or executive. This
history demonstrates that a deeper understanding of our legislatures and legislative process has much to contribute to the study of public law generally beyond
the speciﬁc ﬁeld of legislation.
Understanding the historical petition process and its role within the lawmaking process helps identify a countermajoritarian function of the administrative
state other than technocratic governance. From the Founding, one of the primary functions of Congress was to consider and process petitions submitted by
the public. The petition process thus preserved the ability of individuals and minorities to participate in the lawmaking process outside of the majoritarian
mechanism of the vote. Congress afforded these politically powerless petitioners
equal, public, and formal process, even when they were not enfranchised. As the
size of the public grew and the forms of participation became specialized to particular regulatory areas, Congress constructed new commissions and boards to
facilitate continued public participation. By building these myriad commissions
and boards, Congress preserved a vital aspect of the lawmaking process: a formalized voice for individuals and minorities.
In short, understanding the historical petition process helps to deﬁne the
wide range of innovative forms of governance created by Congress over the last
two hundred years. The contours of the so-called “Fourth Branch” are more difﬁcult to deﬁne than its critics admit, as its actual infrastructure lives within the
executive, the legislature, and the courts, as well as places in between. This infrastructure also performs a range of functions beyond that of “administration,”

285.

The similarities between the petition process and the dynamics of equity bear further reﬂection. Aristotle deﬁned equity (epieikeia) as a force that intervenes into “law where law is defective because of its generality.” ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 112 (Robert C. Bartlett & Susan D. Collins eds., 2011). The petition process functioned, in part, as a mechanism
to allow individuals and minorities the ability to seek redress for injustice in a speciﬁc application of a general law. The speciﬁc connection between petitioning and equity has yet to be
fully articulated, but scholars have begun to draw a connection between equity and the petition dynamics at work within the administrative state. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Equity and
Administrative Behaviour, in EQUITY AND ADMINISTRATION 326 (P.G. Turner ed., 2016) (“At its
widest, we can label as ‘equity’ any intervention that corrects the law when it is defective owing to its generality . . . . This tradition stands behind one variant of the ‘equity of the statute,’
and it formed the backdrop to the desire for ﬂexible expert administration in the early twentieth century.”).
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including adjudication and regulation. By naming these innovative forms of governance as the “participatory state,” rather than the “administrative state,” we can
better map their place and function.
Today, the participation of individuals and minorities takes place through
procedures within the specialized boards, commissions, and agencies that comprise the administrative state—in particular, the notice and comment rulemaking
process and the petitions required by the APA. Under the APA, agencies offer a
petition process for rulemaking and undergo notice and comment on proposed
regulations. 286 But as the case studies illustrate, the participatory state spans
more broadly than the “administrative state,” encompassing the courts—including specialized courts like the Court of Claims—and Congress. As for the latter,
the modern Congress has attempted to facilitate participation in lawmaking
through our current lobbying system. But, as I have argued elsewhere, these attempts fall short of ensuring the public, equal, and formal participation protected by the Petition Clause.287
Finally, understanding the historical petition process allows us to better understand the role played by the participatory state within our republican democracy. Libertarian critics of the administrative state decry these innovative forms
of governance as rights-invading communitarian outgrowths of the Progressive
Era, foreign to our Founding documents. However, understanding the myriad
federal commissions, agencies, and boards as loci for public participation in the
lawmaking process challenges the libertarian narrative. Congress constructed
these new forms of governance not as a Weberian bureaucracy but rather as a
means to protect individual rights—particularly the right to petition—and individual liberty. Liberty in this sense is Kelsenian.288 It encompasses more than
simply freedom from regulation; it also encompasses freedom to participate
equally in making the laws by which one is governed.289 The mechanism of the
vote ensures the participation of the majority through a majoritarian decision
rule. In fostering participation for individuals and minorities, the participatory
state functions as supplement to the majoritarian vote and ensures equal liberty.290 In this way, these innovative forms of governance actually further the libertarian project by ensuring equal liberty and democratic legitimacy through
their facilitation of participation.

286.

5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
McKinley, supra note 27, at 1198-1204.
288. HANS KELSEN, THE ESSENCE AND VALUE OF DEMOCRACY 26-33 (Nadia Urbinati & Carlo Invernizzi Accetti eds., Brian Graf trans., 2013).
289. Id. at 28.
290. Id. at 58 (discussing the petition as a mechanism of representation similar to the vote).
287.
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Moreover, contrary to the proponents of libertarian administrative law, this
vision of liberty and of republican democracy is not twentieth-century communitarianism, but rather part and parcel of our Founding culture. The Founding
generation viewed petitioning as an integral component of a republican form of
government and codiﬁed the value of minority participation into the Petition
Clause. In constructing the participatory state, Congress translated that petition
right into innovative forms of governance.291 As the population grew, along with
its demands, so too did Congress’s ability to meet its citizenry’s participation demands through the creation of the participatory administrative state.
As noted above, in addition to protecting the rights and liberty of individuals, the participatory state also plays an important role in protecting democratic
legitimacy by empowering minority lawmaking. The theory of the participatory
state therefore joins a growing body of scholarship that identiﬁes and examines
these structural protections for minorities throughout government.292 Most notably, recent work by Heather Gerken documents the structural protections for
minorities at work within state and local government and celebrates “the power
wielded by agents within our Tocquevillian bureaucracy.”293
But minorities wield power at the federal level as well. The participatory state
expands Gerken’s framework to encompass minority empowerment at the national level, including the petitioner’s power to force the majority to engage
through our Tocquevillian bureaucracy. So, too, here are the “discursive beneﬁts
of structure” at work within the petition process in Congress and the myriad
commissions, boards, and agencies that constitute our modern state. 294 Local
structures, in Gerken’s words, “giv[e] political outliers an opportunity to force
engagement, set the national agenda, [and] dissent from within rather than
complain from without.”295 Similarly, political outliers force engagement, set the
agenda, and voice dissent from within the petition process.296 Beyond the often

291.

Cf. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1189-1211 (1993) (outlining a
theory of constitutional interpretative ﬁdelity based on “translation” from the original interpretative context to the present); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity
and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 396-410 (1995) (justifying the New Deal reforms as part of
this translation, which adapted old understandings to a new social reality); Lawrence Lessig,
Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1371-76 (1997) (further explicating the theory of constitutional translation as a process that preserves interpretative ﬁdelity).
292. See supra note 39.
293. Heather K. Gerken, Abandoning Bad Ideas and Disregarding Good Ones for the Right Reasons:
Reﬂections on a Festschrift, 48 TULSA L. REV. 535, 537 (2013).
294. Gerken, New Nationalism, supra note 39, at 1894.
295. Id. at 1895.
296. See supra Part I.

1604

petitioning and the making of the administrative state

ineffective soapbox offered by speech protections, the participatory state provides a certain amount of power to minorities to engage in lawmaking.
B. Updating Our Lawmaking Models
An excavation of the petition process also affords us the opportunity to interrogate some of the models that operate in the background of our public law
scholarship, many of which contribute to the ongoing “crisis” over the legitimacy
of administrative lawmaking. After all, we cannot determine whether it violates
the Constitution when Congress creates commissions and boards unless we have
some model of how legislatures ought to legislate and what constitutes delegation. Nor can we determine whether one of those commissions or boards violates
the separation of powers by comingling executive, judicial, and legislative functions unless we have a model of what constitutes executing, adjudicating, and
legislating.
Comprehensive models of the lawmaking process have become less common
as the world of legal scholarship has become more siloed.297 Increasingly, scholars focus their attention on a single institution in government: scholars of federal
courts and civil procedure focus on the courts, administrative law scholars study
the agencies and the APA, and election law scholars focus on state and federal
elections. Even constitutional law, the traditional home of more comprehensive
theories, has become a house divided between the study of structure and the
study of rights.298 Structuralists focus on the distribution of power, while rights
scholars study the protection of liberty and equality—leaving neither to study
the lawmaking process overall and how those structures and institutions might
also contribute to the protection of equality and liberty. Few theories within the
legal academy offer a comprehensive view of the lawmaking process or offer
models of those lawmaking institutions in action and collaboration. This Section
documents how legal process theory—perhaps the last comprehensive model remaining—fails to incorporate petitioning into its theory of lawmaking.

297.

See e.g., Paul J. Stancil, The Legal Academy as Dinner Party: A (Short) Manifesto on the Necessity
of Inter-Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1577, 1577 (“The various branches
or ‘silos’ of legal academic thought remain rather distressingly segregated and, in some cases,
almost deﬁnitionally opposed to one another.”).
298. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1286, 1293 (2012) (“A conventional
divide in constitutional law separates structure from rights. . . . But the rights/structure distinction is in many ways misleading.”).
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1. Legal Process Theory: Lawmaking Without Petitioning
Recent scholarship has documented the reemergence of legal process theory,
a shopworn but highly respected theory of the lawmaking process within both
the academy and the courts that applies across a range of areas, including statutory interpretation, federal courts, administrative law, and legislation.299 Legal
process theory has had a longstanding hold on public law scholarship generally
and particularly on debates over relationships between lawmaking institutions.
Most notably, it fostered the extended debate over the countermajoritarian difficulty,300 which continues to haunt the judiciary despite sustained criticism. 301

299.

See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Nino’s Nightmare: Legal Process Theory as a Jurisprudence of
Toggling Between Facts and Norms, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 865 (2013); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reﬂections on the
Hart and Weschler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953 (1994); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme
Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: An Essay on Law and Political Science, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 352 (2010); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Why and How To Teach Federal Courts Today, 53 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 693 (2009); Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding
Congress’s Plan in an Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 66 (2015); Joseph
Landau, Due Process and the Non-Citizen: A Revolution Reconsidered, 47 CONN. L. REV. 879
(2015); Marin K. Levy, Judging Justice on Appeal, 123 YALE L.J. 2386 (2014) (book review); John
F. Manning, Justice Ginsburg and the New Legal Process, 127 HARV. L. REV. 455 (2013); Jenny S.
Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013 (2008); Victoria F. Nourse, Elementary Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking Legislative Intent and History, 55
B.C. L. REV. 1613 (2014); Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of a New Legal Realism:
Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (2009); Daniel B.
Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 919 (1989) (book review);
Edward L. Rubin, Statutory Interpretations and the Therapy of the Obvious, 68 VAND. L. REV. 159
(2015) (book review); Edward Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1996); Jeffrey Rudd, The Evolution of the
Legal Process School’s “Institutional Competence” Theme: Unintended Consequences for Environmental Law, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1045 (2006); Geoffrey C. Shaw, H.L.A. Hart’s Lost Essay: Discretion and the Legal Process School, 127 HARV. L. REV. 666 (2013).
300. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 16 (2d ed. 1986).
301. See, e.g., Robert W. Bennett, Response: On Substantiation of Positive Social Theory, 95 NW. U. L.
REV. 977, 979 (2001) (“This ﬁxation is puzzling, because the rest of American democracy is
not sensibly thought of as ‘majoritarian.’”); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court 1988—
Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 71 (1989); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1717-29 (2008); Barry
Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty,
Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 165 (2002) (“Perhaps the best proof that we are dealing with an
obsession is that most of the scholarship in which the countermajoritarian difficulty appears
rests on an overly simpliﬁed and largely inaccurate understanding of American democracy.”).
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Legal process theorist John Hart Ely advanced an enduring model of judicial review with his contribution to that debate.302 Within the ﬁeld of administrative
law, legal process theory is experiencing a recent renaissance, as administrative
law scholars connect the institutionalist focus of their ﬁeld with its legal process
theory roots.303 The ﬁeld of legislation has long acknowledged and celebrated its
debts to the legal process school. And modern critics of the administrative state
work within the legal process framework in advancing their attacks.
Legal process theory took hold in the years after the Second World War.304
At its creation, the fathers of the theory, Henry M. Hart and Albert Sacks, aimed

302. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
303.

See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMIC, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3-13 (1994); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 259-63 (1999); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 63-85 (2006); Oren
Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 74-75 (2008); MarianoFlorentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 490-97 (2005);

Neal Devins, Congressional Factﬁnding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis,
50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1209-13 (2001); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum
of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1171-75 (2008); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable
Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1275, 1291-92 (2006); Philip P.
Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases:
An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1713-16 (2002); Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian
Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1279-86 (2001); Clayton P. Gillette, Expropriation and Institutional Design in State and Local Government Law, 80 VA.
L. REV. 625, 631-35 (1994); Jeff A. King, Institutional Approaches to Judicial Restraint, 28 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 409, 432-40 (2008); M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in
Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 649-54 (2001); Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 717-25 (2008); Jide Nzelibe &
John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, 115 YALE L.J. 2512, 2514-16 (2006); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Bottom-Up Versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 933, 934-37 (2006);
Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039,
1108-28 (2016); Frederick Schauer, The Dilemma of Ignorance: PGA Tour, Inc. v. Casey Martin,
2001 SUP. CT. REV. 267, 288-95; Mark Seidenfeld, Who Decides Who Decides: Federal Regulatory
Preemption of State Tort Law, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 611, 640-49 (2010); Catherine M.
Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449,
484-520 (2008); Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1424 n.2 (2011); Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 126-43
(2005); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV.
885, 914-19 (2003); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1,
65-122 (2004).
304. Henry M. Hart and Albert M. Sacks, both professors of law at Harvard Law School, compiled
materials for a course on legal process theory that went unpublished. However, they copyrighted a version of their course materials in 1958. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS,
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to chart a middle ground between the schools of legal realism and legal formalism that had dominated debates over the nature of law during the ﬁrst half the
twentieth century.305 Hart and Sacks eschewed the naïve simplicity of formalism
and accepted the basic premise of legal realism that legal principles do not alone
bind judges. 306 But in crafting legal process theory, they offered a defense of
democratic lawmaking against the legal realist charge that lawmaking was necessarily arbitrary and political, and lacked any form of restraint on the individual
exercise of power.307
Hart and Sacks saw institutional architecture as the means by which to constrain individual lawmakers—even when the letter of the law might not.308 Law
was legitimate not because it transcended legal institutions, but because it arose
from them and was made according to accepted procedures within those institutions.309 Setting acceptable procedures and then creating law pursuant to those
procedures provided, to Hart, the core of democratic legitimacy: “[D]ecisions
which are the due result of those [institutional] processes must, by that fact
alone, have a moral claim to acceptance.”310 Hart and Sacks offered a view of the
law as a system that existed within and between institutions of varied functions
and they constructed models of each of those institutions, including legislatures. 311 These models describe institutions through their different functions
and often convey a greater sense of the separation of powers than existed historically.312
The legal process theory contains one glaring omission. The legislature of
legal process theory structures government, manages appropriations, and oversees the executive through the making of laws.313 According to Hart and Sacks’s
model, however, the legislature ought not facilitate public engagement other
than through the electoral process. In other words, the legislature of legal process

THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tentative ed.
1958).
305. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 4, at 2032-33.
306. Id. at 2037-38.
307. Id. at 2038-40.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 2040 (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr., Note on Some Essentials of a Working Theory of Law
(revised, n.d.), in PAPERS OF HENRY M. HART, JR., Box 17, Folder 1, 36 (on ﬁle with the Harvard
Law School Library)).
311. 1 HART & SACKS, supra note 304, at 1-9.
312. Id. at 183-89.
313. Id. at 186-88.
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theory does not exist to ensure participation of individuals and minorities.314
While Hart and Sacks discuss brieﬂy the private claims system and “private” legislation, they declare that “these trivia” fall within the province of the courts and
the administration.315 Nowhere do the models of the legislature, or the executive
for that matter, mention the petition right or the participation of individuals and
minorities during the lawmaking process beyond claims petitions.316 To the contrary, they offer only some strong and largely critical language regarding lobbying.317
2. Amending Legal Process Theory
The history revealed by this Article suggests that in addition to overseeing
the structures of government through the making of laws, legislatures also must
ensure the participation and representation of the public during the lawmaking
process. They can do so by preserving and maintaining the petition right. More
than a mere extension of the vote, the original petition process protected the
ability of individuals and minorities to seek redress of their grievances before
their government. As Justice Story remarked nearly two hundred years ago, the
right to petition is fundamental to a republican form of government.318 A legislature of republican design is not simply majoritarian—it offers mechanisms for
participation by the majority and the minority through both the vote and the
petition process. A government must protect both mechanisms in order to maintain the legitimacy of its lawmaking process.
The authors of legal process theory may have simply overlooked petitioning.
Legal process theory came of age in the 1950s and 1960s after the LRA dismantled the last vestiges of the petition process.319 The Legal Process teaching materials reﬂect an ignorance of this lost history. In particular, Hart and Sacks’s commentary on the triviality of private bills and criticism of lobbying, coupled with
a total omission of the petition right, dates the piece to a time when the petition
process had fallen out of favor in Congress.320 Moreover, neither Hart nor Sacks

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 4, at 2049-51.
HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 701.
See 2 HART & SACKS, supra note 304, at 1006-12 (discussing the use of private bills to resolve
claims petitions).
HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 804-10.
See 2 STORY, supra note 1, § 1894, at 645.
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 4, at 2040-42.
See supra Section I.D.2.
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had actually spent much time working in Congress. Their models, while sophisticated, reﬂected no ﬁrsthand experience with the lawmaking process. Both Hart
and Sacks had worked in the executive branch, long after the New Deal vision of
the administrative state as bureaucratic and technocratic regulator had supplanted any memory of the petition process.321
But the omission also reﬂects a fundamental ﬂaw at the heart of legal process
theory. As William Eskridge and Phillip Frickey explain, legal process theory
failed to address considerations of representation generally, and particularly representation of individuals and minorities in the lawmaking process:
Chapter 4 of The Legal Process, in fewer than ﬁfty pages . . . , provided no
more than a glimpse at direct democracy, the election of public officials,
and reapportionment. For example, the chapter expresses doubts about
the judicial capacity to force reapportionment, especially where a federal
court order concerns a state legislature. In “Note on the Relation Between
the Voters’ Choice and the Determination of Public Policy by the Legislature,” Hart and Sacks considered the responsiveness of elected officials
to public preferences but did not concern themselves with the “Carolene
question,” namely, whether discernible groups with demonstrably less
power in the political process should receive any judicial protection
against legislation that disadvantages them.322
Most controversially, the teaching materials for The Legal Process, crafted in the
1950s, omitted any mention of Brown v. Board of Education.323
The omission of Brown reﬂected Hart and Sacks’s commitment to a strict
proceduralism that accepted any law passed by proper procedures as legitimate,
no matter how unjust the law or the lawmaking procedures.324 This formalist
stance came into direct conﬂict with the civil rights movement of the 1960s,
which demanded increased participation for aggrieved minorities.325 In its refusal to provide any normative vision or constitutional requirement regarding
the representation of minorities, legal process theory failed to respond to those
long excluded from the very institutions that legal process theory celebrated.326

321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

ERNST, supra note 14, at 62; Edward A. Purcell. Jr., Henry Melvin Hart, Jr., in THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 255-56 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009).
HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at cxi n.272 (citations omitted).
Id. at cvi.
Id. at cxi.
Id. at cvi-cxiii.
Id.
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Hart and Sacks’s careful work was soon thoroughly rejected by scholars of critical
legal studies.327
Incorporating petitioning and the petition right into our models of lawmaking could remedy this fundamental ﬂaw in legal process theory. An understanding of petitioning could reinvigorate the proceduralist vision of democracy at the
heart of legal process theory, but in such a way that recognizes the importance of
minority participation and protection. Frickey, Eskridge, and others have criticized the strict proceduralism of legal process theory for its lack of any normative
baseline to evaluate procedures, many of which have historically excluded minorities.328 Some have argued that proceduralism is itself the ﬂaw.329
But as political theorists Maria Paula Saffon and Nadia Urbinati describe,
proceduralist democracy could provide the normative baseline necessary to distinguish good process from bad process.330 Saffon and Urbinati argue that proceduralist democracy—that is, a vision of democracy that sees proper process as
paramount over proper outcomes—is the best means of protecting “equal liberty
in a context of pluralism and dissent.”331 Proper procedures should accommodate various and often competing visions of the good, and allow for fair and equitable resolution of those disputes through formal process.332 But in order for
proceduralism to protect equal liberty, lawmaking procedures must protect equal
participation, including minority participation through mechanisms other than
the majoritarian vote.333 Petitioning provides one such mechanism.
iv. petitioning within the administrative state
The same philosophy governs the approach of citizens or groups of them to administrative agencies (which are both creatures of the legislature, and arms of
the executive) and to courts, the third branch of Government. Certainly the
right to petition extends to all departments of the Government. – California
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972).

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

William N. Eskridge & Phillip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal
Process School Era, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 691, 710-17 (1987).
See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at cvi-cxiii.
Id.
Saffon & Urbinati, supra note 39, at 443-45.
Id. at 442.
Id.
Id.
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A. The Administrative State Within Our Constitutional Framework
The ﬂaws of the legal process theory have practical implications for the contemporary assault on the administrative state. Indeed, scholars have documented
a recent resurgence in direct and indirect structural challenges to the administrative state, and these simple models are often at the heart of this resurgence.
Gillian Metzger recently declared the administrative state as “under siege” from
challenges to restrictions on presidential power over administration, administrative adjudication, and congressional delegation—all motivated by separation of
powers concerns. 334 Simple legal process models animate this attack. Contemporary critics invoke unreconstructed tripartite models to deﬁne “legislative,”
“judicial,” and “executive” power—often without nuance or explication.335 They
often express discomfort with any activities by one branch that resemble, as described by the simple tripartite model, the activities of another branch. Moreover, because critics rely on these simple models, they ﬁnd so-called delegations
of these powers deeply suspect, and they ground these suspicions with textual
arguments. Originalist or libertarian critics often point to the Vesting Clauses of
Article I and Article II, assuming that “vested” means non-delegable. Drawing
upon the simple legal process models, critics presume that the public’s only check
on national power is the vote. In this view, the lack of oversight by a branch with
an electoral process presumably leaves agencies, boards, and commissions “unaccountable.” In these and many other ways, legal process theory has cemented
a strict view of the separation of powers at odds with the history of petitioning.
The following sections describe the critics and their models, and provide a case
study of how incorporating petitioning into these simple models could reshape
doctrine around the structure of the administrative state.

334.
335.

Metzger, supra note 5, at 8.
To provide a few examples, Justice Thomas, concurring in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n,
invoked a simple model of the three branches and their strict separation as “core principles of
our constitutional design, essential to the protection of individual liberty.” 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1215
(2015) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, dissenting from Mistretta v. United States, accused the majority of condoning the creation of “a sort of junior-varsity Congress” in allowing
for the creation of an independent sentencing commission within the judiciary. 488 U.S. 361,
427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Judge Ginsburg, architect of a strand of libertarian administrative law, invoked the simple model to criticize abandonment of the non-delegation doctrine following the New Deal in his speech to the Cato Institute. Douglas H. Ginsburg, On
Constitutionalism, 2002-2003 CATO S. CT. REV. 16-17.
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1. The Critics and Their Models
The simple models of legal process theory are ubiquitous throughout the
federal courts. The Supreme Court often struggles to articulate coherent theories
and to create public law around these simple models. Chief Justice Roberts, a
noted practitioner of legal process theory,336 recently provided an apt illustration
of the difficulties of the simplistic model in practice.337 In Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, Chief Justice Roberts dissented from the Court’s holding that “legislature” in the Elections Clause could
mean the people of Arizona, who had formed through initiative an independent
redistricting commission.338 The majority turned to dictionaries to deﬁne “legislature” as “the power that makes laws.”339 Chief Justice Roberts writing in dissent struggled to explain exactly why this deﬁnition was insufficient. 340 He
turned ﬁrst to the seventeen other references to a state legislature in the Constitution and pointed out inconsistencies with the majority’s holding. How could
the people in Arizona take a legislative recess?341 How can all of the people of
Arizona have a “most numerous branch”?342 When trying to deﬁne “legislature”
directly, however, Chief Justice Roberts stumbled.343 The Chief Justice resorted
to leaning heavily on the notion of representation, distinguishing his “legislature” from the Court’s as “the representative body which ma[kes] the laws of the
people.”344 But what exactly he meant by “representative body” was never made
clear.
Chief Justice Roberts has applied similarly simple models to support challenges to the administrative state. He took a lead role in the attack on the administrative state in his majority opinion in King v. Burwell—an opinion that summarily rejected any deference to administrative interpretation of the Affordable
Care Act.345 Although Chief Justice Roberts did not articulate in great detail in

336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.

Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in the Era of
Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 66 (2015).
Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
Id. at 2671 (holding that “the people may delegate their legislative authority over redistricting
to an independent commission just as the representative body may choose to do”).
Id.
Id. at 2680-81 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2681.
Id. at 2680.
Id.
Id.
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).
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King why deference was inappropriate for signiﬁcant questions, he had signaled
discomfort with administrative deference previously. His reasoning on this issue
relied heavily on the simple tripartite legal process model of lawmaking. In City
of Arlington v. FCC, Chief Justice Roberts began his dissent with the simple
model: “One of the principal authors of the Constitution famously wrote that
the ‘accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands, . . . may justly be pronounced the very deﬁnition of tyranny.’”346 Modern
administrative agencies, according to Chief Justice Roberts, exercise legislative
power by “promulgating regulations with the force of law,” exercise executive
power by “policing compliance with those regulations,” and exercise judicial
power by “adjudicating enforcement actions and imposing sanctions.”347 It was
the absence of a strict separation of powers in administrative agencies and the
“danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state” that moved
Chief Justice Roberts to dissent against deference. 348 His dissent addressed
nothing about the speciﬁc constitutional arrangement of the agency at issue. Rather, it took the form of many modern critiques in framing its critique in general
terms: “the claim is that the whole thrust and purpose of modern administrative
government deviates from the Framers’ separation of powers design.”349
Although frequently cast in originalist terms, judicial discomfort with the
administrative state often derives from consequentialist fears that lack of accountability will lead to intrusions into individual liberty. 350 These concerns,
however, reﬂect the simplistic notions of accountability and liberty emanating
from the legal process model. According to these critics, the Framers formulated
a strict, tripartite separation of powers to hold government accountable through
the vote, thereby avoiding intrusions into liberty. As Chief Justice Roberts wrote
for the Court in Free Enterprise Fund:
Our Constitution was adopted to enable the people to govern themselves, through their elected leaders. The growth of the Executive
Branch, which now wields vast power and touches almost every aspect
of daily life, heightens the concern that it may slip from the Executive’s
control, and thus from that of the people.351
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347.
348.
349.
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351.

569 U.S. 290, 312 (2013) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (J. Cooke
ed., 1961)).
Id. at 312-13.
Id. at 315.
Metzger, supra note 5, at 45-46 (footnote omitted).
Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The New Coke: On the Plural Aims of Administrative Law,
2015 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 44.
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010).
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Policing the boundaries of this tripartite framework is not simply formalism for
formalism’s sake; rather, any transgression leaves the government able to intrude
broadly into private life by avoiding public accountability through the vote. To
these critics, the primary, if not the only, accountability mechanism against intrusions into personal liberty is the power of the franchise.
The “siege” on the administrative state by the courts has been supported by
attacks from the academy. Legal process’s simple tripartite model of separation
of powers also underlies many contemporary academic attacks on the administrative state. Libertarian critics decry that “[t]he post-New Deal administrative
state is unconstitutional, and its validation by the legal system amounts to nothing less than a bloodless constitutional revolution.”352 Gary Lawson and others
have not minced words in leading the charge to reclaim what they envision as
our lost constitutional framework.353 In a prominent, albeit extreme, example,
Philip Hamburger compared administrative adjudication and administrative
rulemaking to oppressive practices of royal prerogative in Britain like the Star
Chamber and the High Commission.354
Academic attacks are largely framed in originalist terms, lamenting the lack
of an explicit constitutional basis for the administrative state. These critics cite
the New Deal as the point when our constitutional framework deviated from
original intent.355 Richard Epstein, for example, highlights not simply a constitutional moment, but a sharp break between “Our Two Constitutions” during
the 1930s.356 Our original Constitution, according to Epstein, “says absolutely
nothing about the existence, let alone the organization and regulation, of these
administrative agencies.”357 The structure of these agencies “represents a conscious and complete inversion of the principle of separation of powers.”358 Citing
the “death of constitutional government,” Gary Lawson describes a Constitution
that restricted the powers of the national government to those enumerated in the
constitutional text.359 Crucially, he locates this restriction in the Vesting Clauses’
enumeration of powers as distinctly legislative, executive, and judicial, and as
resting in separate spheres of government.360 However, according to Lawson,
352.

Lawson, supra note 16, at 1231 (footnotes omitted).
Id.
354. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 135, 462 (2014).
355. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION 1-71 (2014).
356. Id.
357. Id. at 39.
358. Id.
359. Lawson, supra note 16, at 1233.
360. Id. at 1237-38.
353.
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pragmatic concerns over the ability of our national government to govern have
caused us to abandon our Constitution, because we tell ourselves that “Congress
simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general
directives.”361
Few defenders of the administrative state have confronted its critics on their
own terms. Instead, they have most often pushed back on the movement’s underlying presumptions: strict constitutional construction, and a national government of limited, enumerated powers.362 Of course, critics of the administrative state would respond that these defenders are guilty of choosing the
administrative state over the Constitution.363 But even accepting critics’ textualist premises, the longstanding function of petitioning within the legislative process poses some fundamental challenges to their critiques.
First, petitioning complicates the simplistic notion of legislative power described by the tripartite model of separation of powers. From the Founding, the
petition process within Congress resembled more closely adjudication than the
legislative power envisioned by the simple tripartite model. Yet the Founding
generation and the Founding Era Congress envisioned petitioning as an integral
aspect of lawmaking and interpreted the vested powers to encompass petitioning. From the very ﬁrst days of the young Congress, individuals submitted petitions in the form of formal documents, like complaints, and Congress institutionalized procedures to respond. 364 By contrast to the Star Chamber, the
petition process was public; petitions were read on the ﬂoor and each step in the
petition process was made part of the formal record. Denial of a petition was not
a “legislative act” that required bicameralism and presentment, and could be
completed by the decision of a single committee.365 Granting a petition could
result in general legislation, passed through the traditional legislative process.366
But it could equally result in a private bill or even the decision of an agency,
board, or commission.367

361.
362.

363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

Id. at 1241 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)).
See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 667 (1984); see also Adrian Vermeule, No, A Review of
Is Administrative Law Unlawful by Philip Hamburger, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1547 (2015).
Lawson, supra note 16, at 1241.
See supra Section I.C.
See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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This practice did not end with the Founding generation. Petitions dominated
Congress’s docket until well into the twentieth century.368 Much of this process
did not fall squarely into the tripartite model categories of legislative, executive,
or judicial. Congress would investigate and ﬁnd facts to resolve petitions, often
involving the executive and the judiciary—both state and federal—to assist in
that process.369 It is unclear whether this process of working out the application
of a general rule to particular cases is itself a legislative or an executive act. But
both Congress and the executive created exceptions and amendments to general
rules in response to petitions, much like the administrative state does today.370
In related fashion, excavating the institution of petitioning problematizes a
different aspect of the strict separation of powers described by the tripartite
model: that each branch operates in isolation. From its earliest days, Congress
drew on the assistance of the other branches to process petitions, both to support
Congress in providing due process to petitioners and to run the petition process
independently.371 Also from the beginning, Congress expressed concerns over its
own internal capacity to provide petitioners due process.372 In order to facilitate
and protect the right to petition, Congress constructed through statute innovative forms of governance that could afford petitioners due process and could scale
to meet the demands of a growing population.373 One of the earliest examples
arose from the First Congress with the statute that created the Patent Board, the
precursor to the Patent and Trade Office and one of the earliest administrative
commissions.374 Petitions for patents had historically been resolved through the
passage of private bills, for which the Constitution required bicameralism and
presentment. 375 With ratiﬁcation still a recent memory, the Patent Board resolved petitions for intellectual property without private bills. Rather, the Board
could issue a patent upon a simple majority vote of the three-member Board and
the signature of the President.376 Congress saw the creation of boards, commissions, agencies, and courts to process petitions as necessary to meet its obligation
to protect the petition right.

368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
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375.
376.

See supra Figures 3 and 4.
See supra Section II.A.
Again, the similarities here between the petition process and that of the dynamics of equity
bear noting. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.B.
See supra Part II.
See supra Section I.B.
See supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.C.
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From the Founding period onward, members of Congress rarely raised concerns over separation of powers in creating these innovative forms of governance.377 Instead, they expressed an obligation to protect the petition process, a
process seen as fundamental to lawmaking, and the right to petition, a right seen
as fundamental to liberty. The petition process, like much of the institutional
history of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, therefore complicates the
simple model of separation of powers that Lawson has inferred from the Vesting
Clauses.378 Lawson’s interpretation of the Vesting Clauses, even under the strictest textualist and originalist terms, is likely much too narrow.
Last, excavating the institution of petitioning problematizes the simple notion of accountability derived from the tripartite model. Congress saw petitioning as an integral part of the lawmaking process because it recognized the necessity of engaging with the public directly during lawmaking. 379 As outlined
above, because political power was not a prerequisite to participation in the petition process, petitioning provided a mechanism for individual and minority
participation. Individuals and minorities could petition, even if they could never
persuade or even garner the attention of an electoral majority. In this way, the
petition process served as a complement to the purely majoritarian mechanism
of the vote.380 Petitioner grievances included a range of harms incurred by government policy, natural disaster, or private deprivation.381 Through the petition
process, Congress grappled with the complexities of general laws and the unintended consequences of applying general laws to a large and heterogeneous public.382 Libertarian critiques of the administrative state overlook petitioning and
the important function it served as a mechanism of representation.383 These critics are less reliant on textual arguments about the Vesting Clauses, but they nevertheless argue that the administrative state is a headless extra-Constitutional
leviathan, wholly unaccountable to the people through the electoral process.384
These concerns about a deﬁcit of electoral accountability inspire judicial invocations of the non-delegation doctrine. For example, Justice Kennedy recently
noted the “unique constitutional position” of administrative agencies in his call

377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
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384.

See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
See Lawson, supra note 16, at 1238.
See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section II.B.
See Metzger, supra note 5 (summarizing the libertarian critique); see also Sunstein & Vermeule,
supra note 9 (same).
See Ginsburg, supra note 335, at 16-17.
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to limit agency discretion, because “[i]f agencies were permitted unbridled discretion, their actions might violate important constitutional principles of separations of powers and checks and balances.”385 Libertarians see the non-delegation doctrine as an important check on administrative power because the
electorally accountable Congress must limit the agencies’ discretion with an intelligible principle.386 However, such concerns rest on the presupposition that
voting is the only mechanism of representation within our republican form of
government. Understanding the petition process as a meaningful mechanism of
representation for individuals and minorities on par with the vote could provide
an alternative means of accountability for the agencies. In particular, the Petition
Clause’s quasi-procedural due process right could be used to hold agencies accountable by forcing them to engage with the public, consider input, and respond. It is possible that the procedural due process requirements of the petition
right could provide sufficient mechanisms of accountability to calm libertarian
concerns. For example, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Fox went on to offer the
procedural protections of the APA as a partial solution to his concerns over
agency accountability and non-delegation.387
The administrative state is “under siege” by direct and indirect structural
challenges in large part because of concerns over its constitutional status. Locating and identifying the origins of the administrative state in the petition process
can begin to situate, on ﬁrmer historical and constitutional footing, the administrative state within our constitutional framework. By understanding the function of the petition process and the petition right, critics could begin to move
away from the overly simplistic tripartite models of legal process theory. From
the Founding, petitioning has performed an integral function within our lawmaking process, both in facilitating the participation of individuals and minorities in lawmaking and providing an important mechanism of representation to
supplement the vote. Congress saw building the infrastructure of the administrative state as necessary to provide petitioners due process and to protect the
right to petition. As an outgrowth of the petition process, the administrative
state now performs the important functions of the petition process.388

385.

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 536 (2008) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
386. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 415.
387. Fox, 556 U.S. at 537 (“[T]he APA was a ‘working compromise, in which broad delegations of
discretion were tolerated as long as they were checked by extensive procedural safeguards.’”
(quoting Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 1193, 1248 (1982))).
388. It bears noting that the Supreme Court has already recognized that the petition right extends
to administrative agencies. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510
(1972). This recognition, however, was not grounded in the historical relationship between
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2. A Case Study in Correcting the Models: The Legislative Veto
In the well-known case of INS v. Chadha, the Supreme Court held that Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, a so-called “legislative
veto” provision, was unconstitutional.389 The Immigration and Naturalization
Act set a general rule that all foreign nationals would be deported for having
“remained in the United States for a longer time than permitted.”390 It also authorized the Attorney General to make exceptions to the general rule upon petition by an individual for a deportation suspension.391 Without further action by
Congress, the Attorney General’s grant of a petition for deportation suspension
was ﬁnal.392 Section 244(c)(2) of the Act, however, required the Attorney General to report all petitions granted to the House of Representatives, which could
overrule or “veto” the Attorney General’s grant of a petition through the passage
of a resolution.393
The Supreme Court struck down this arrangement, grounding its holding in
a putatively originalist understanding of the separation of powers. Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the Court, held ﬁrst that the legislative veto provision was an
Article I legislative act in that “Congress has acted and its action has altered
Chadha’s status.”394 Drawing upon an 1897 Senate Committee Report that documented longstanding congressional practice, the Court deﬁned an Article I legislative act as an act that “contain[s] matter which is properly to be regarded as
legislative in its character and effect.”395 Further, the Court held that the Constitution includes an enumerated and exclusive list of four contexts where Congress
may engage in a legislative act without bicameralism and presentment: the initiation of impeachments, conducting a trial following an impeachment, the approval or disapproval of presidential appointments, and the ratiﬁcation of treaties.396 It is unclear from the Court’s opinion how it determined that this list was

the petition process and the administrative state. Id. At the time of these decisions, this history
was not before the Court. The full contours of the extension of the Petition Clause to the
administrative state have yet to be articulated.
389. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 928 (1983).
390. Id. at 923 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)).
391. Id. at 923-924 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1)).
392. Id. at 925.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 952.
395. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 1335, at 8 (1897)).
396. Id. at 955.
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exclusive and not simply illustrative.397 But because a legislative veto of the grant
of a petition was nowhere enumerated, the Court held Section 244(c)(2) unconstitutional.398
Interestingly, in reaching its holding that the veto was a legislative act, the
Court recognized that the petition process established by the Immigration and
Naturalization Act was once part of the “private bill procedure” or petition process.399 “After long experience with the clumsy, time-consuming private bill procedure, Congress made a deliberate choice to delegate to the Executive Branch,
and speciﬁcally to the Attorney General, the authority to allow deportable aliens
to remain in this country in certain speciﬁed circumstances.”400 But any recognition of the dynamics of the petition process stopped there. The Court concluded
that the delegation of the petition process was itself a legislative act, and therefore Congress could not amend that delegation without another legislative act.401
The Court disregarded that Congress’s delegation of the petition process was
itself conditioned with the veto.402 Justice Powell’s concurrence fared no better
in arguing that the legislative veto was unconstitutional as a usurpation of judicial power. His opinion protested that, because Congress had made speciﬁc determinations regarding six individual cases, “[i]t thus undertook the type of decision that traditionally has been left to other branches.”403
Examining INS v. Chadha through the lens of the petition process would direct a different outcome. Like many other statutes before it, the Immigration and
Naturalization Act provided a mechanism to process petitions on a particular
subject: here, petitions for the suspension of deportation. This process was quite
consistent with historical practice. From the Founding, Congress often established rules of general applicability, like that of the general deportation rule, and
then allowed for exceptions to that general rule through the petition process.404
Signiﬁcantly, a petition denial never required Congress to pass a bill—a so-called
legislative act. It was only the grant of petitions that often, but not always,405

397.

Id.
398. Id. at 959.
399. Id. at 954.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 955 (“Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked.”).
402. Id.
403. Id. at 965 (Powell, J., concurring).
404. See supra Part I.
405. Congress often directed executive behavior through simple resolution. See Fisher, supra note
44, at 277.
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required the passage of a bill, either public or private. 406 Committees at the
Founding often declined petitions without passing any bill or even a resolution,
and they often declined to act on favorable reports from the executive.407
Founding Era practice thus undermines the Court’s reasoning in Chadha
based on the simplistic conception of the separation of powers. The denial of a
petition was either not a legislative act or it was a legislative act that did not require bicameralism and presentment.408 Congress oversaw the work of the executive through the petition process and the Legislative Reorganization Act only
strengthened this oversight function.409 The Court should not have held the legislative veto in this context unconstitutional.
Congressional practice following Chadha undermined its holding. The legislative veto, a mechanism in place since the 1930s in thousands of statutes, apparently outlived the Supreme Court’s handiwork in Chadha. In 1993, Louis
Fisher reported that Congress had enacted more than 200 legislative vetoes since
the Court held the practice unconstitutional.410 Chadha also drove the legislative
veto underground into “informal and nonstatutory understandings” between
congressional committees and executive agencies.411 As an integral component
of the petition process and of Congress’s ability to oversee executive involvement
in that process, the legislative veto seems to have outlived even the Supreme
Court’s best efforts. This persistence can be understood as the extension of a
historical requirement of congressional oversight to ensure petition rights in the
participatory state.
B. Participatory Administrative Law
Beyond defending the administrative state against structural challenges by
constitutional critics, a deeper understanding of the participatory state would
also lead to amendments to current administrative law doctrine. The cramped
version of the horizontal separation of powers embraced by legal process theory
and adopted by contemporary originalists has not only led to structural challenges, it has also inﬂuenced important administrative law precedents. This section considers a line of doctrine—administrative due process—that would beneﬁt from incorporating notions of the participatory state.
406. See supra Part I.
407.

See supra Part I.
408. See supra Part I.
409. See supra Part I.B.
410. Fisher, supra note 44, at 277.
411. Id. at 288.
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As described in Part I, the First Congress institutionalized a formal petition
process within its parliamentary procedures and its recordkeeping. Congress
then oversaw implementation of the petition process within the courts and
within agencies, boards, and commissions. In ratifying the Petition Clause, the
Founders codiﬁed formal, public, access to the lawmaking process.412 The petition process originated in Congress, but Congress has over time expanded the
process by statute to the executive and judicial branches. For the agencies, the
APA codiﬁed these practices into its formal procedural protections that included
an administrative petition process and the requirement of notice and comment
rulemaking.413 In this way, the APA guaranteed and speciﬁed the petition right
in the same way that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure guaranteed procedural
due process.
Without naming the petition right explicitly, administrative law doctrine has
long recognized the quasi-procedural due process right of the kind promised by
the Petition Clause. For example, in Morgan v. United States (Morgan II),414 the
Supreme Court mandated that “administrative proceedings of quasi-judicial
character” satisfy “the fundamental requirements of fairness” that structure judicial proceedings.415 In Morgan II, that “fundamental fairness” required a hearing that comported with traditional notions of due process. 416 Chief Justice
Hughes, writing for the Court, did not root the source of the “fundamental fairness” requirement in constitutional text—the Due Process Clause or otherwise.
Rather, the Court rested its holding in the structure of the administrative arrangement and the need to preserve public trust in its processes.417 An understanding of petitioning, from which many of these administrative processes
grew, justiﬁes the concerns over fairness animating the Court in Morgan II.
Moreover, the Petition Clause could provide additional structure and direction
to administrative due process doctrine.
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See McKinley, supra note 27, at 1147-53.
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2012).
Morgan v. United States (Morgan II), 304 U.S. 1 (1938). Issued on April 25, 1938, Morgan II
formed part of the legal process trifecta that included Carolene Products, of footnote four fame,
and Erie. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Court issued all three opinions on the same day. Notably,
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Products through judicial oversight of the political process; Erie through the protection of federalism; and Morgan II through the protection of individuals petitioning the administrative
state.
Morgan II, 304 U.S. at 14-19.
Id.
Id. at 14-15.
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Over the last ﬁfty years, concerns over “fundamental fairness” have driven a
“due process revolution,” as the courts have required ever increasing procedural
protections for those who engage with the administrative state.418 Unlike the
Court’s earlier foray into “fundamental fairness,” the recent due process revolution rests squarely in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.419 In a series of cases in the 1970s, litigated largely in the context
of public beneﬁts, the Court developed a test for administrative due process that
embodied a utilitarianism foreign to the notion of procedural due process. 420
The Mathews v. Eldridge test involves complex balancing between the interest of
the petitioner, the value of additional procedure, and the interest of the government—including the public cost of implementing the additional procedure.421
Not surprisingly, judicial review of administrative procedure under the test has
been “intrusive,” as Eldridge placed courts in the role of second-guessing
transsubstantive administrative procedure and determining proper procedures
piecemeal on a case-by-case cost-beneﬁt analysis.422
One possible explanation for the failures of the Eldridge test is its development within the context of public beneﬁts, an area traditionally governed by the
petition process.423 As Parts I and II described, from the Founding, individuals
requested and received public beneﬁts, usually pensions, by petitioning Congress and the executive. The petition process’s guarantee of formal consideration
and response was not rooted in Due Process Clause concerns over deprivation of
life, liberty, or property, but rather in the Petition Clause and its preservation of
the right to a fair, equal, and public petition process.424 The “fundamental fairness” of Morgan II more closely captures the petition right than does Eldridge’s
concern over beneﬁts as property.425
As it stands, the Eldridge test fails to fulﬁll the values reﬂected in the petition
process and suffers from fundamental internal ﬂaws. As identiﬁed by Mashaw,

418.

Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in
Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 28 n.1
(1976) (collecting cases).
419. Id.
420. Id. at 47 & n.61.
421. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
422. Mashaw, supra note 418, at 29-30.
423. See supra Section II.B.
424. McKinley, supra note 27, at 1182-85.
425. Morgan v. United States (Morgan II), 304 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1938). Cf. Charles A. Reich, The New
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the value of a particular public beneﬁt or its utility to a particular individual cannot be determined on a case-by-case basis.426 Forcing a petition right into the
text of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments has produced the awkward result
that public beneﬁts—in Eldridge, social security payments—are property.427 The
Eldridge test then asks the court to value that property for the petitioner in order
to determine what process is due.428 As a result, the Eldridge test places the court
in the position of policymaker, as it must determine the optimal design of individual administrative programs—balancing the cost of procedures against the
likelihood that those procedures would beneﬁt the petitioner.429
These ﬂaws reﬂect the shortcomings of an administrative due process right
grounded solely in utilitarian justiﬁcation. Because Eldridge leaves courts with
only one value to consider—i.e., overall welfare maximization—the court must
calculate the minute tradeoffs of particular policies in each particular case. An
administrative due process that considered values other than general welfare
might result in a role for the courts that is less intrusive into policy details, but
more protective of petitioners’ rights. Such reform would also answer criticism
that the Eldridge test fails to consider many of the values traditionally found in
procedural due process, like equality, transparency, predictability, rationality,
and participation.430
An administrative due process right rooted in the Petition Clause would require courts to review administrative procedure for equality, formality, and
transparency only, without consideration of whether the case involved a property
interest of a sufficient value. In this way, administrative due process would more
closely resemble Mashaw’s theory of dignitary due process than the utilitarian
balancing of Eldridge.431 Mashaw’s theory of dignitary due process envisions administrative due process as distinct from any substantive interest, focusing instead on the protection of participants’ dignity through proper procedures.432
Although he does not make the connection wholly explicit, Mashaw frames dignity in terms of the ability to participate equally in lawmaking.433 Like Mashaw’s
dignitary due process, the petition right does not promise or protect a particular
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Mashaw, supra note 418, at 47-49.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-35 (1976).
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See Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L.
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Id.
Id. at 922-25.
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utilitarian balance, but rather safeguards equality, formality, and transparency in
participating in the lawmaking process.434
Consider, by way of illustration, Mashaw’s description of the expressive
value of voting, as distinguished from its miniscule utilitarian value:
Disenfranchisement in a general election carries with it a loss of political
power so minute that cold calculation should convince us that our personal franchise is in practical, political terms valueless. Yet something—
the affront to our self-image as citizens, the sense of unfairness from exclusion—has led some of us to pursue this “valueless” privilege to participate in political decisionmaking through every available court. Involvement in the process of political decisionmaking, via the exercise of a right
to voter participation, seems to be valued for its own sake. The same may
well be true for other processes.435
The same may well be true for petitioning. From the Founding, the petition right
offered a mechanism of participation for individuals and minorities in complement to the majoritarian mechanism of the vote. Like voting, the petition right
is valued for its own sake. Congress built portions of the administrative state
speciﬁcally to facilitate this mechanism of participation and to protect the right
to petition.436 Developing an administrative due process right rooted in the Petition Clause would safeguard the courts’ role in reviewing administrative due
process, but limit that role to the consideration of the values intrinsic to the petition right—that is, public, formal, and equal process.
C. Objections
This Section addresses two possible objections to recognizing the administrative state as a participatory state and amending administrative law in light of
the petition right. First, proponents of libertarian administrative law might object that they are most concerned with the administrative state’s regulation of
markets beyond the authority granted in the Commerce Clause. The Petition
Clause, they could argue, cannot resolve this concern. The second objection pertains to agency rulemaking as opposed to agency adjudication. Does the participatory state theory justify lawmaking outside of the legislature without abiding
by the strictures of Article I, Section 7?

434.

Id. at 899-904; see also McKinley, supra note 27, at 1182-85.
Mashaw, supra note 430, at 888.
436. See supra Part II.
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With respect to the ﬁrst objection, proponents of libertarian administrative
law are in large part concerned with the regulation of markets by the administrative state.437 Those concerned with communitarian redistribution writ large
might take little solace in viewing the administrative state as protecting the right
to petition. Moreover, the Petition Clause alone cannot resolve concerns over
Congress exceeding its power under the Commerce Clause. As described in Part
II, Congress entertained petitions related to the regulation of Commerce, but
petitioning alone could not expand the government’s jurisdiction. 438 In fact,
Congress often dismissed petitions for grievances outside of its enumerated
powers to redress.439 Future research could explore the relationship between petitioning and Commerce Clause doctrine.
However, even if the Petition Clause does not calm concerns over the growing regulation of commerce, it at least helps separate the constitutional debate
from a more general ideological debate over neoliberalism. It is helpful to clarify
that the libertarians’ concern is not aimed at “big government” in the abstract,
which we now know includes structures built to protect rights and facilitate participation of individuals and minorities. Rather, the concerns are rooted in how
big government operates. An understanding of petitioning could help reﬁne this
debate. For example, concerns over redistribution being foreign to our founding
culture are simply false. The petition process served from the Founding as a
mechanism to facilitate the redistribution of wealth and property to the disadvantaged, most notably veterans and victims of disasters.440 Social welfare programs are not evidence of a colonial communist culture, but are part and parcel
of our republican form of government. If proponents of libertarian administrative law nevertheless remain concerned about the constitutional question of the
scope of the Commerce Clause power, then we ought to focus the debate there.
With respect to the second objection, questions remain regarding whether
the petition process underlies not only the structures of administrative adjudication, but also legislative rulemaking in the absence of bicameralism and presentment. Historically, the petition process was housed entirely within legislatures,
and Congress created boards and commissions to resolve petitions elsewhere.
Congress often resolved petitions by passing laws through the formal Article I,

437.

See Lawson, supra note 16, at 1231; Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 393.
See supra Section II.C.
439. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 8, supra note 84, at xv.
440. See DAUBER, supra note 20, at 17 (“Requests for government relief of loss began in the earliest
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Section 7 process. But the fact remains that Congress constructed so-called independent agencies to facilitate the petition process in the earliest days of the
Republic.
The petition process at the very least reveals complexities in the lawmaking
process that should dictate which legislative actions are subject to the strictures
of Article I, Section 7, and which are not. Although Congress did resolve petitions through the passage of legislation, those laws were often private bills. Private bills occupy a unique status in the lawmaking process. The historical record
is replete with examples of Congress viewing private bills as something not truly
legislative and potentially exempted from the requirements of bicameralism and
presentment. Congress was quick to delegate jurisdiction over petitions calling
for resolution by private bill, and members repeatedly decried the private bill
process as something not meriting the attention of Congress.441
Can the private bill process, a process that by deﬁnition raises the rights of
speciﬁc parties, provide any support for agencies’ general rulemaking powers?
Perhaps because we refer to private bills as “bills” and not judgments, we often
create too strict a divide between common law regulation and legislative regulation. The petition process, like the common law, created precedent that Congress
drew on in resolving future petitions. In this way, private bills, like judicial opinions, created general rules. In many ways, private bills preﬁgured the approach
of our agencies as they adjudicate particular cases and formulate general rules
over time.
conclusion
Even for those who do not subscribe to the vision of a “Constitution in Exile,”
a sense of discomfort with the “amorphous” constitutional status of the administrative state can still be cause for concern—especially when that discomfort, as
it often does, operates in the background of our doctrine. Naming the petition
process and understanding its integral role within the architecture of the administrative state could alleviate some of the discomfort with administrative lawmaking. Unlike institutional histories and arguments from intellectual and statutory consensus, petitioning offers the loudest critics the exact salve they seek—
constitutional text. At the very least, the Petition Clause could focus and clarify
a debate that has raged for decades, often unmoored from the history of the practices that have constituted our government from the Founding.
In responding to critics of the administrative state, we might also develop a
deeper and more reﬁned understanding of our lawmaking institutions. To the
extent that the fathers of legal process theory discussed representation at all, Hart
441.

See supra Sections II.B.1, II.B.2.
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and Sacks conﬁned themselves to a narrow exploration of the majoritarian mechanisms of the vote and of direct democracy. A conversation about the representation and participation of individuals and minorities within the lawmaking process is long overdue. Relegating the protection of minorities to the rights side of
the Constitution ignores the complex structures by which individuals and minorities wield power and participate in making the laws that govern them. Empowerment and participation preserve a democratic value distinct from the substantive outcomes that preoccupy rights theorists. Recognizing this important
value would strengthen our lawmaking models.
There is a role for the ﬁeld of legislation in reforming these models. In contrast to most other administrative histories, this Article has told the story of the
administrative state from the perspective of Congress. For scholars of government structure—even those concerned with the rights of minorities—Congress
has a greater role to play in the legal academy. Scholars of legislation can ensure
that role is recognized. Legislation carries the legacy of its predecessor, legal process theory, and the ﬁeld of legislation has evolved over the years with an explicit
recognition and embrace of those intellectual roots. Scholars of legislation must
ensure that the theory does not again neglect the representation of minorities.
Recognition of the petition process and the vitality of the participatory state
could provide an early step in remedying this neglect.
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methods appendix
This Article draws upon the Congressional Petitions Database developed by
our research team at the North American Petitions Project in the Harvard Department of Government. The Congressional Petitions Database, which I have
worked with a team to assemble, is the ﬁrst comprehensive database of petitions
submitted to the federal Congress. The Database is an amalgam of two datasets
drawn from the Congressional Journals and the Congressional Record respectively
to create a comprehensive database of all petitions introduced to the Congress
from the Founding until 1950 for the Senate and from the Founding until 2013
for the House of Representatives. The ﬁrst dataset is drawn from the Journals
and consists of all petitions introduced to both chambers from the Founding in
1789 until 1875. The second dataset is drawn from the Record and consists of all
petitions introduced to the Senate from 1882 until 1948 and all petitions introduced to the House of Representatives from 1882 until 2013. Because the methods used to build each portion of the Database vary, the following describes each
dataset in turn before describing limitations of the Database as a whole. Finally,
this Appendix brieﬂy touches upon the archival materials from the early Congresses drawn upon by the Article and, in some instances, published here for the
ﬁrst time.
A. The Journals Dataset
To create this dataset, we used a digitized version of the Congressional Journals, the formal published record of the daily proceedings of Congress that are
produced by the clerk’s office of both chambers. The Journals consist of a summary of the day’s proceedings in Congress, including bill introductions and
other forms of legislative action. Although the Journals have been kept continuously since the Founding to the present, a digitized version of the Journals is currently available from the Founding only until 1875. As a consequence, this portion of the Database tracks petition introductions for the ﬁrst one hundred years
or the ﬁrst approximately ﬁfty Congresses.
By excavating the legislative record of each chamber, we were able to overcome the need to aggregate an immense amount of archival materials necessary
to fully capture the volume of petitioning activity in Congress over time. These
archival materials are often not available in digitized or machine-readable format
and some have been lost to ﬁre or other disaster. However, because the petition
process in Congress required each petition introduction to include a full reading
of the petition on the ﬂoor of each chamber, a summary of each petition and
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subsequent action on that petition became part of the Journals.442 Summary petition introductions from the Journals generally included the names of the primary petitioners, the residence of the petitioner, the prayer of the petition, and
the initial disposition of the petition. A petition introduction extracted from the
Journal of the First Congress illustrates:
A petition of the tradesmen, manufacturers, and others, of the town
of Baltimore, in the State of Maryland, whose names are thereunto subscribed, was presented to the House and read, stating certain matters,
and praying an imposition of such duties on all foreign articles which can
be made in America, as will give a just and decided preference to the labors of the petitioners, and that there may be granted to them, in common with the other manufacturers and mechanics of the United States,
such relief as in the wisdom of Congress may appear proper.
Ordered, That the said petition be referred to the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union.443
Summary petition introductions from 1789 until 1875 exceeded 145,000 in
number, which made hand-coding these introductions unmanageable. Instead,
we built and implemented an algorithm that both locates and extracts petition
introductions from the Journals. We developed a methodology for the algorithm
that relied upon supervised learning. Over a two-year period, a team of human
coders (undergraduate students, law students, and Ph.D. students) located and
extracted petition introductions from over two hundred randomly selected days
from the Journals. The human coders would also code for each petition a series
of ﬁelds from petitioner name, demographics, geography, referrals, subsequent
legislative procedures, and petition topics. Oftentimes at least two human coders
coded each randomly selected day with a third human coder functioning as a
tiebreaker. From these hand-coded data, we developed a training dataset that
instructed the petitions algorithm to better locate petition introductions and to
identify information within those petition introductions. Eventually, we reﬁned
the algorithm to identify more petition introductions in the Journals than those
identiﬁed by the human coders and to create an even more accurate dataset than
that created by hand.

442.

We initially began work on our Database with a combination of the Annals of Congress and the
Register of Debates. However, we soon discovered that these sources consistently resulted in an
undercount of petition introductions. Even our initial tests on the Journals resulted in a petition introduction count of two to three times the number documented in the Annals and the
Register.
443. H.R. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (Apr. 11, 1789).
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We also reﬁned the algorithm to classify each petition into a particular topic.
To develop this aspect of the algorithm, we relied on our supervised learning
approach by having human coders classify petitions into a set of thirteen mutually exclusive categories.444 The human coders classiﬁed 1,650 petitions overall.
We then trained an ensemble classiﬁer on the hand-coded petitions and used the
resulting model to predict the topics for the remaining petitions in the Database
(more than 100,000 count) for the House of Representatives only.445 We predicted these topics by using the text of each petition description from the Journals. For each petition description, we removed the numbers and punctuation,
put all characters in lower case, removed stopwords, stemmed the document,
and stripped any remaining whitespace. With the cleaned petition description,
we then created a document term matrix for each petition. We removed infrequently used words and then normalized the word frequencies.
Using the document term matrix, we then trained the ensemble classiﬁer on
the hand-coded petitions and used the results to predict the category for the notyet coded petitions. The ensemble classiﬁer consists of two different classiﬁers:
a random forest model and a support vector model.446 To classify each petition,
each classiﬁer yields a predicted probability that a petition falls into a speciﬁc
category. We averaged the results from each classiﬁer to yield a single predicted
probability for each petition.
To create exclusive categories of petitions, categorizing each petition into a
single one of the thirteen possible categories, we performed thirteen independent binary classiﬁcations. For example, for the category “INFRASTRUCTURE
/ TRANSPORTATION,” we placed all coded petitions that fell in this category
into the “on-topic” category and all other petitions into the “off-topic” category.
We then ran the classiﬁers on the training set of petitions and recovered predicted probabilities for the full set of petitions in the sample. We repeated this
process for each of the thirteen categories. As a result, for each petition we actually estimated the predicted probability that it was on the topic of each of the
thirteen categories. To make our prediction, we placed the petition into the category with the highest predicted probability.
The classiﬁcation procedure performed well. To test the accuracy of classiﬁcation using this method, we initially trained the model on 1,200 of the 1,650

444.

The categories are: “INFRASTRUCTURE / TRANSPORTATION,” “MILITARY / NAVY,”
“PENSIONS,” “TARIFF / TAX,” “PUBLIC LANDS / TERRITORIES,” “CLAIMS,” “EXPENDITURES,” “FINANCE / BANKING / ECONOMY,” “CIVIL RIGHTS / SLAVERY,”
“FOREIGN AFFAIRS,” “JUDICIARY,” “LABOR,” and “REGULATION.”
445. In future development of the Database, we will undertake a similar analysis for the Senate.
446. For details on the models, see TREVOR HASTIE ET AL., THE ELEMENTS OF STATISTICAL LEARNING: DATA MINING, INFERENCE, AND PREDICTION (2d ed. 2009).
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total coded petitions, and then we made predictions on the remaining 450 petitions. By comparing our prediction to the petitions coded by our human coders,
we assessed the performance of the classiﬁcation procedure implemented. Across
all categories, the classiﬁer placed the petition in the correct category 84% of the
time.
In summary, the Journals dataset yielded 145,892 petition introductions for
both chambers during the eighty-six-year period from the Founding in 1789 until 1875, when the digitized version of the Journals ends.
B. The Record Dataset
To create this dataset, we used a digitized version of the Congressional Record,
the formal published record of the in-depth daily proceedings of Congress. The
Record in general includes far more in-depth information on the daily legislative
activity in Congress than the Journals, including verbatim transcripts of speeches
and debates. The Record began publication in 1873. However, the ﬁrst few years
of the Record do not keep a thorough enough record to draw upon for petition
introductions. To avoid systematically undercounting petitions from this period,
the Congressional Petitions Database limits use of this dataset until after 1883.
We have currently located and extracted petitions from the digitized version of
the record from 1883 until 1948 for the Senate and from 1883 until 2013 for the
House of Representatives.447
For this dataset, we again exploited the procedural step in the petition process. Petition introductions required reading the petition on the ﬂoor of each
chamber, thereby making the petition introduction part of the formal record of
Congress. Similar to the Journals, the Record recorded summaries of petition introductions that included the name of the primary petitioners, their residence, a
summary of the prayer of the petition, and initial petition disposition. Petition
introductions in the Record commonly appear as a series of introductions clustered together in a many sequential paragraphs. A petition introduction section
extracted from the Record of the 68th Congress illustrates:
Mr. JONES of Washington presented a petition of sundry citizens of
Ballard, Wash., praying for the passage of legislation granting adequate
compensation to postal employees, which was referred to the Committee
on Post Offices and Post Roads.
He also presented a petition of sundry citizens of Seattle, Wash., praying for the passage of House bill 4123, for the reclassiﬁcation of postal

447.

Future development of the Database will complete petition location and extraction for the
Senate until 2013.
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salaries, which was referred to the Committee on Post Offices and Post
Roads.
He also presented a petition of sundry citizens of Walla Walla, Wash.,
praying for the adoption of the so-called Mellon tax-reduction plan,
which was referred to the Committee on Finance.
He also presented a petition of sundry citizens of Walla Walla, Wash.,
praying an amendment to the Constitution regulating child labor, which
was referred to the Committee on Judiciary.
Mr. LADD presented the petition of Zach Shackman and 77 other citizens of Berlin, N. Dak., praying for an increased tariff on wheat and repeal of the drawback and milling-in-bond provision of the so-called
Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act, which was referred to the Committee on
Finance.
He also presented the petition of Ed. Mack and 75 other citizens of
Lewistown, Mont., praying for increased tariff duties on wheat, ﬂour,
ﬂax, and linseed oil, which was referred to the Committee on Finance.448
We developed an independent algorithm to locate and extract petition introductions in the Record. The algorithm ﬁrst identiﬁed the section in the Record
that contained petition introductions for that day. It would then identify the ﬁrst
petition introduction recorded in that section and then it would cycle through
the remaining petitions.449 It would continue to cycle through the remaining petitions until no further petition introductions remained. For each petition introduction, the algorithm extracted the name of the primary petitioner, the text description of the prayer of the petition, and the initial petition disposition by
using regular expressions. The initial petition disposition would extract the particular legislative action, most commonly a referral or tabling, and would extract
the name of the entity to whom the petition was referred, either a committee or
the executive. The algorithm also extracted geographic data on the petition using
a combination of natural language processing and regular expressions.
In summary, the Journals dataset yielded 348,116 petition introductions for
both chambers during the period from 1883 until 1948. The Journals dataset also
yielded 16,010 petition introductions for the House of Representatives from
1949 until 2013 for a total of 364,126 petition introductions.

448.

65 CONG. REC. 1549 (1924).
449. This dataset also beneﬁtted from the additional procedural requirement that implemented a
unique numbering system for all petitions submitted to the House of Representatives after
1920.
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C. Limitations
Together, the Journals and Record datasets constitute the Congressional Petitions Database, the largest and most comprehensive database of petitioning activity in Congress ever created. The Database yields 510,018 petition introductions and documents over two hundred years of legislative activity. Although
there is much here to be celebrated, there are also some notable limitations that
bear mention.
First, the Database lacks panel data for the eight-year period from 1875 until
1883. This postbellum period could prove crucial for studying in-depth the petitioning activity around the Reconstruction Amendments and other advocacy
efforts following the Civil War. However, as described, digitized versions of congressional records for this period are lacking. The digitized version of the Journals ends in 1875 and the Record does not begin dependably until 1883. Although
digital versions of the Annals and the Register are likely available for this period,
we found these sources systematically undercount petition introductions by
comparison to the Journals. We aim to ﬁll this gap in our panel data either by
locating an alternative, more dependable source for tracking legislative activity
for this period or by locating a digitized version of the Journals that extends past
1875. Until then, however, this Article omits these data entirely from its analysis.
Second, the Congressional Petitions Database currently combines datasets
developed with two distinct methodologies, each developed to differing levels of
rigor. In particular, we developed the Journals dataset after creating the Record
dataset and have improved our methodology over time. In constructing the Journals dataset, for example, we used a supervised learning approach that reﬁned
our algorithm with two years of hand-coded data. Although we developed and
reﬁned the algorithm for the Record database, we did not use a supervised learning approach.
Third, we began our project on the Congressional Petitions Database on the
digitized version of the Record relied upon for the Record dataset. This digitized
version is a proprietary version of the Congressional Record sold by Westlaw.
Westlaw built the digitized version of the Record with an optical character recognition conversion of scans of the Congressional Record documents. Optical character recognition of scanned documents rarely creates clean and accurate text,
especially when applied to historical documents. It did not create the cleanest
database here. Even a cursory review of the digitized Record reveals occasional
garbled text that does not lend itself to easy cleaning. In an ideal process, we
would return to the Record to apply our later developed methodology of supervised learning and our more reﬁned algorithm, including topic coding. However,
the somewhat rough Record data does not yet lend itself to the reﬁned work of
the algorithm we developed with the Journals.
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Fourth, the Congressional Petitions Database currently tracks only petition
introduction, but further legislative activity is difficult to assess. Later procedural
developments, like the requirement of a unique petition identifying number in
the House of Representatives after 1920, came too late to provide a simple means
to track activity on a single petition over time. Rather, the Journals or Record include petition introductions that are often separated by days or even months or
years from later legislative action on that petition. The Congressional Petitions
Database allows us to chart the volume of petition introductions in Congress for
the very ﬁrst time and it also allows us to chart initial dispositions of those petitions in the form of referrals, tabling, or otherwise. By conducting individual
searches, I am often able to locate further action on particular petitions. However, the Database does not yet allow for tracking further legislative action in the
aggregate. We plan future development of the Database to resolve this issue. In
particular, we plan to develop a unique identiﬁer for each petition and to chart
consideration and disposition of each petition over time.
D. First Congress Archival Materials
The Article also draws on archival materials from the ﬁrst four Congresses
housed in the National Archives in Washington, D.C. I used these materials to
supplement the Congressional Petitions Database and the secondary literature
on early petitioning. In particular, I aimed to deepen the understanding of the
petition process in Congress and its institutional form with a review of the early
record on petition procedure. Archival materials were often unavailable on microﬁlm and I instead reviewed the original documents.
Among these original documents, I discovered a set of bound documents titled “Petition Books” by the archivists at the National Archives. While these documents are cited in a few summaries of materials in the Documentary History of
the First Federal Congress, these so-called petition books are nowhere duplicated
or described. Nor have these materials been published or described in any alternative publication. My reproduction in this Article of these petition books is
likely the ﬁrst publication of these materials, and the ﬁrst in-depth exploration
of their signiﬁcance.
I have begun initial research into the extent to which Congress maintained
petition books over time by reviewing the inventory of the National Archives.
The National Archive inventory guides for the House of Representatives note
petition books within the clerk’s record for almost all Congresses from the
Founding until the 83rd Congress (1953-1955). Following the 83rd Congress, the
House could have maintained petition books, but the National Archives does not
provide an inventory guide for this later period. The National Archive inventory
guides for the Senate are less clear and petition books were less commonly listed
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in the clerk’s records. In future research, I plan to locate these petition books and
examine their scope in greater depth.

1637

